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CHAPTliR 1. INTRODUCTION
Arable topsoil is important in sustaining human life. Soil is a
necessary natural resource for most food production today, and is also
a primary source of much of man's clothing and shelter. The loss of
soil from the force of water or air movement at some level reduces the
potential for any soil to satisfy these human needs*
Soil erosion was recognized on this continent years before the
constitution was written. Land then was not scarce, and when the
settlers eroded the soil beyond cultivability or exhausted the fertil
ity of the soil, they could simply move west to better lands or culti
vate virgin land on their own farms.
By 1935, from erosion surveys and various soil surveys, it was
estimated that soil erosion had already ruined approximately 100
million acres in the United States for practical cultivation and that
nearly an additional 100 million acres had lost "from one-half to all
the topsoil" (Pimentel, 1976, p. 150). In this same year, with soil
erosion still running rampant and recognized as a national menace,
Congress passed the Soil Conservation Act. The act stipulated that the
Soil Conservation Service (SCS) be responsible for a national soil con
servation program on a permanent basis.
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The SCS and the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Service (ASCS) have, since their inceptions, employed soil conservation 
programs offering technical assistance and cost-sharing programs as 
"carrot approaches" to reduce soil erosion. Land grant colleges have 
also provided education to aid in reducing soil erosion levels for 
several decades. A series of studies conducted at Iowa State 
University by Frey (1952), Held and Timmons (1958), and Blase and 
Timmons (1960) estimated that in the Ida-Monona-Hamburg soil associa-
tion in Western Iowa average annual soil loss had decreased from 21.1 
to 14.1 tons per acre from 1949 to 1957. Although soil loss levels 
were still well above tolerance (T)-values of about 4 to 5 tons per 
acre (approximate maximum annual soil erosion levels that will allow 
maintenance of soil productivity), apparently public unrest over the 
issue was settling during this period. 
In the late 1960s and early 70s, soil degradation again entered the 
limelight when many environmentally conscious individuals and groups 
expressed concerns that sediment and chemicals in runoff water were pol-
luting water and causing s i ltation in dams and waterways. Also, during 
the 70s several developments took place that aggravated the soil erosion 
problems. Increased foreign demand for feed grains, wheat, and soybeans 
enticed farmers to bring more marginal land out of pasture or forage 
crops into more erosive row-crop production. Rising energy prices and 
other factors applied inflationary pressures on the economy which, 
combined with the rise in real corn-grain and soybean prices and 
further inflationary expectations, caused land prices to triple over
the decade. Many farmers who borrowed money at high interst rates of
the late 70s and early 80s to purchase expensive land and machinery are
in a position where they must farm intensively to survive. Even
farmers who are not in binding financial situations are probably acting
as short-run profit maximizers by raising row crops if they do not
associate costs with high levels of soil erosion.
So, after almost a half—century of efforts to reduce soil erosion
to acceptable levels (about 4 to 5 tons of soil erosion per acre),
there is still insufficient cooperation or individual effort by the
private farming sector to attain such goals. A recent estimate of the
annual soil loss in the United States is 5 billion tons, of which
roughly 4 billion tons are washed away and 1 billion tons are blown
away (Pimentel, 1976). SCS State Conservationist William Brune in the
spring of 1982 stated that with the frequent heavy spring rains in
Xowa, it is estimated that nearly two million acres of land have lost
20 tons or more of topsoil per acre . . , some fields have lost as much
as 200 tons per acre" (the Sioux City Journal, May 28, 1982). Con
sidering that under favorable conditions it takes 100 years naturally
to form 150 tons per acre (roughly an acre inch) of new topsoil, it is
apparent that such losses are depleting this vital resource.
The soil erosion occurring today may in the future result in re
duced soil productivity, greater water pollution, further damage to
wildlife and the environment in general» and may even jeopardize U.S.
national security. However, soil erosion also imposes mai^ costs on
farmers and society in general that are much more obvious as they are
incurred. Some of these are: (1) loss of nutrients such as nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potassium; (2) lower infiltration rate and water-
holding capacity; (3) deterioration of soil structure; (4) loss of
cropland by gullying and streambank erosion; (5) increased power
requirements for tillage operations; (6) division of fields by gullies;
and (7) plant population reductions or the need to replant resulting
from sedimentation, rill erosion, or crop drownage.
Several factors interact in determining soil erosion levels on any
given soil. The more important factors are: (1) physical character
istics of the soil; (2) degree of slope of the soil surface; (3) slope
length; (4) the length of time and the intensity with which rain or
wind act on the soil; and (5) the amount and degree of soil coverage
provided by plant foliage and residue* Although a small amount of soil
erosion occurs naturally over time, the cultural practices used hy
farmers can greatly accelerate the soil erosion process and increase
sediment delivery (soil that actually leaves fields and enters water
movement systems). Tillage systems and crop rotations used by farmers
greatly determine the time and degree to which soil is exposed to the
elements. For example, moisture in soil that is tilled in the fall can
expand and cause soil to crumble, allowing wind to blow it out of
fields. Fields clean-tilled for seedbed preparation make the soil very
susceptible to erosion from spring rains in Iowa. Also, structural
practices used by farmers can alter the (tegree and length of soil
slopes. Examples are terraces, catch basins, ridge-planting, listing,
and contouring. Grass waterways and strip-cropping can be used in con
junction with these practices to aid in reducing soil erosion; both
types of practices are often referred to as supporting practices. The
above individual cultural practices or combinations of them—rotations,
tillage systems, and supporting practices—will be referred to in this
stutfy as soil and water conservation practices. Synonyms that will
frequently be used throughout are crop management systems or cropping
systems.
Several economic, social, pl^sical, and institutional factors may
affect farners' decisions on use of soil and water conservation prac
tices. Among these are tenure, attributes of lease arrangements, age,
attitude toward land stewardship, family size, wealth, cash flows,
assumed discount rate of returns over time, length of planning horizon,
awareness of erosion, education, product and input prices, cost-sharing
and technical assistance programs, credit availability, capital costs,
perceptions of risk associated with particular practices, management
skills, farm size, field size, field borders, and others. The factor
that must head-up this list, however, is the profitability of these
alternative practices in the context of the farm firm. In the competi-
tive industry of crop production, practices implemented that are not
most profitable to the firm threaten its survival. Farm decisionmakers
that operate the most efficiently, i.e. produce the largest output at
the lowest per unit cost, can over time gain control of agricultural
production resources, particularly land.
Many of the above mentioned factors indirectly and directly affect
farm profitability, thus influencing farmer's decisions on use of soil
and water conservation practices. This study will focus on the follow-
ing three factors: (1) tenure and leasing arrangements; (2) capital
constraints and costs; and (3) farm size.
Objectives of the Study
The objectives of this study are to determine possible effects of
tenure, capital constraints and costs, and farm size on the economics
of soil and water conservation practices in Iowa. Specific objectives
are to: (1) analyze the economics of various soil and water conserva
tion practices from the perspective of individual farm owner- and
tenant-operators and landlords under various resource acquisition
arrangements, assuming each is the decisionmaker and a maximizer of
annual before-tax net returns; (2) analyze effects that particular soil
erosion restriction policies may have on net returns and selected soil
and water conservation practices of the above parties; (3) analyze
effects of capital constraints and costs on use of soil and water con
servation practices by the above parties; and (4) discuss effects that
farm size may have on use of soil and water conservation practices.
Organization of the Report
Chapter II presents a discussion of the methodology of the study
and brief model descriptions of the farms analyzed. Chapter III dis
cusses effects of tenure and leasing arrangements on economics of soil
and water conservation practices. Chapter IV describes the effects of
capital constraints and costs on use of soil and water conservation
practices by parties of the modeled tenure arrangements. Chapter V
presents a discussion of possible effects that farm size may have on
use of soil and water conservation practices. Chapter VI discusses
limitations of the stu<fy and presents several policy implications drawn
from the analysis. Chapter VII contains an overall summary of the
first six chapters and general conclusions. Brief literature reviews
of the topics of discussion are included in the appropriate chapters.
CHAPTER II. METHODOLOGY
It is initially suspected that the relative profitability of crop
management systems with respect to maximum net returns or minimum soil
erosion levels is very soil specific. In addition, soils, machinery com
plements, capital availability, and other resource characteristics are
very specific to individual farm situations. Even the methods by which
production resources are acquired vary from farm to farm. Also, in con
sidering alternative soil erosion restriction policies, it is imperative
to examine the effects of their implementation on individual farm incomes
and changes in use of soil and water conservation practices. For these
reasons, this stutfy analyzes the economics of soil and water conservation
practices utilizing linear programming (LP) models of various individual
representative farms in Iowa. Such models are useful in optimizing a
particular goal or objective function subject to input and output prices,
technical production coefficients, and available resources.^ In this
study LP models are used to maximize 1985 before-tax net returns to the
farm owner and/or operator subject to various capital, land, labor, and
soil erosion constraints, technical production coefficients representing
various crop management systems, and prices of production inputs and crop
outputs.
^For additional information on the theory, uses, and mechanics of
linear programming, see Agrawal &Heady (1972), Sposito (1975), or Heady
& Candler (1973).
Mathematical Representation of the Models
A general mathematical representation of the models used in this
study is presented as follows:
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where:
1 = I,.,. I for the crop products sold,
••• 15 for the crop rotations,
••• 5 for the tillage systems,
••• 4 for the supporting practices (4 « terracing),
... N for the SMUs,
... 3 for the fertilizers (N, P, and K),
2 for herbicides and insecticides,
2, 3 for spring, fall, and other time periods,
2, 3 for the sources of energy (diesel, LP gas, and
electricity),
u = 1, 2, 3 for short, medium and long term capital costs,
and where;
= the number of units of crop i sold,
= the price of one unit of crop i,
= the number of acres of rotation k with tillage
system 1 and supporting practice m on SMU n,
= the per acre cost to the landowner or operator of
rotation k with tillage system 1 and supporting practice
m on SMU n (excluding fertilizer, herbicide, fuel,
insecticide, hired labor, energy, capital, erosion tax,
and terracing costs).
k = 1
1 = 1
m = 1
n = 1
q = 1
r = 1
s = 1
t - 1
Qi
mn
'klmn
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Fq = the number of pounds of fertilizer q purchased,
FCq = the cost per pound of fertilizer q,
Hj. = the number of units of herbicide or insecticide r,
Cj. = the cost per unit of herbicide or insecticide r,
Ls ® the number of hours of hired labor required in time
period s,
Cg = the cost per hour of hired labor in time period s,
~ number of units of energy source t,
£
Ct ® the cost per unit of energy source t,
= the number of dollars of capital of term u required,
C^ = the cost of one dollar of capital of term u,
S « the number of tons of soil loss,
C® = the tax on one ton of soil loss (for use only when.
conservation taxes on soil loss are imposed),
T = the total terracing costs in dollars,
Ct = the fraction of total terracing costs paid by the farmer or
landovmer (i.e. the amount not subsidized or paid for by the
government),
AA^ = the total acres of SMU n available,
^\lmns total hours of labor required in time period s to
raise one acre of crop rotation k, using tillage system 1,
and supporting practice m, on SMU n,
LAg = total hours of non-hired labor available in time period s,
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^^Imnr " total units herbicide or insecticide r required to
raise one acre of crop rotation k, using tillage system 1
and supporting practice ra, on SMU n,
^^Imnt ~ total units of energy source t required to raise
one acre of crop rotation k, using tillage system 1 and
supporting practice m, on SMU n,
TCn ® the total costs of terracing one acre of SMU n,
KR,= the amount of capital of term u needed to raise one
ccxninii
acre of crop rotation k with tillage system 1, supporting
practice m, on SMU n,
^qu ~ amount of capital of term u needed to pur-
KR^
ru
KR » the amount of capital of term u needed to buy
su
KR = the amount of capital of term u needed to buy
tu
KR = the amount of capital of term u required to put
nu
chase one pound of fertilizer q,
® the amount of capital of term u needed to pur
chase one unit of herbicide or insecticide r,
one hour of labor in time period s,
one unit of energy source t.
terracing on one acre of SMU n,
" the amount of annual soil loss per acre under rota
tion k, using tillage system 1 and supporting practice m,
on SMU n,
SLAn » the amount of soil loss that is acceptable on SMU n,
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^ ^ when annual soil loss per acre under crop rotation
k, using tillage system 1 and supporting practice m, on
SMU n is greater than T-values,
« 0 otherwise,
DRA = 0 when annual per acre soil loss is constrained to
t-values,
= otherwise,
^^Imnq ~ amount of fertilizer q needed per acre of crop
rotation k, using tillage system land supporting practice
m, on SMU n, and
^ amount of crop product i produced per acre of
crop rotation k, using tillage system 1 and supporting
practice m, on SMU n.
Explanation of the Equations of the Models
Equation (2.1) is the objective function used in this study. The
objective of the models is to maximize the net returns to land, manage
ment, and family labor. With the exception of conservation taxes on
soil loss, these are before-tax returns.
Therefore, equation (2.1) is maximized subject to the system of
constraints represented by equations (2.2 - 2.12). Equation (2.2)
states that the total acres of a given SMU used cannot exceed the acres
owned or rented. Equation (2.3) states that the total labor required
for raising crops cannot exceed the total amount of family labor plus
the labor hired during the cropping seasons. Equation (2.4) states
14
that the amount of herbicides and insecticides required cannot exceed
the amount purchased. Equation (2*5) constrains the amount of energy
used from different sources to be less than or equal to the amount pur
chased. Equation (2.6) constrains the total terracing costs to equal
the total actual costs of terracing.
Equation (2.7) states that the total requirements of short-,
medium-, and long-terra capital cannot exceed the amount borrowed.
Equation (2.8) constrains the sum of the soil loss from each SMU to
equal the total soil loss for the whole farm. Equation (2.9) states
that the level of soil loss on a given SMU cannot exceed a certain
specified level.
In Equation (2.10), when DRA is set to zero, soil loss for any
given activity is constrained to be less than or equal to t-values.
Equation (2.11) constrains the total amount of fertilizers required to
be equal to or less than the amount purchased. Equation (2.12)
constrains the amount of each crop product sold to be less than or
equal to the amount raised.
Representative Farms
This study essentially is an expanded sensitivity analysis of the
LP models representing 18 Iowa farms used in a larger study of the
economics of soil and water conservation practices by Pope, Bhide and
Heady (1982a and 1982b). The farms are synthesized case studies that
represent different erosiveness classes, principal soil associations.
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land resource areas, and major water drainage systems in Iowa. Three
to five soil mapping units (SMUs) are specified for each farm based on
soil surveys for the areas in which the farms are located. Farm sizes
are set according to the average size of commercial farms in the
areas.
This study utilizes four of the models that were developed in the
Initial study. These farm models were selected from the original farm
models based on the sensitivity of the LP model solutions in the base
study and also to represent different erosiveness levels, from fairly
unerosive to extremely erosive. A map of the locations of all 18 farms
is shown in Figure 1. The farms used in this study are located in east
central Boone County (#2), northwest Van Buren County (#9), northeast
Jasper County (//17) and southwestern Ida County (#18). These farms are
defined in terms of soil delineation, land resource area, watershed,
erosiveness class, and size in Table 1.
The Boone County farm consists of soils of the Clarion-Nicollet-
Webster principal soil association. Tliis is the largest soil associa
tion in Iowa, extending over approximately 12,000 square miles of
northcentral Iowa, roughly 20 percent of the state. The topography is
nearly level to gently sloping, with a few strongly sloping areas.
Many low lying areas are poorly drained, and one-third to one-half of
this soil association area has been artificially drained. This is the
least erosive farm modeled in this study.
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The Van Buren County farm is made up of soils of the Lindley-
Keswick-Weller soil association which occurs in south central and
southeastern Iowa. This soil association occupies about 1,700 square
miles or three percent of the state. A large portion of the soils in
this association are derived from loess and glacial till parent materi
als, and are moderately to severely erosive. Topography varies from
nearly level to very steep. The modeled Van Buren County farm is
moderately erosive.
The Jasper County farm is located in the Tama-Muscatine soil
association of central Iowa. This soil association occupies about
4,000 square miles or seven percent of the state, and consists of a
loess-covered glacial till plain. The topograpl^ in the Tama-Muscatine
association varies from nearly level to very steep. In Jasper County,
the topograpl^ consists of rounded, gently sloping divides, moderate to
strongly sloping side slopes and narrow valleys. The modeled Jasper
County farm is very erosive.
The Ida County farm is located in the Monona-Ida-Hamburg soil
association of western Iowa. This association covers about 2,900
square miles or five percent of the state. The topography consists of
narrow, gently sloping ridges and steep side slopes that gradually
change to nearly level alluvial valleys. The steep loess soils of the
Ida County farm make it the most erosive farm of the study.
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Table 1. Farm descriptions
Boone County Farm
Principal Soil Association: Clarion-Nicollet-Webster,
Location: East Central Boone, Land Resource Area: 103,
River Basin: Des Moines River, Erosiveness Class: #2,
Gross farm size: 350, Net farm size: 320.
X Net Acres
Soil Type Soil Type Slope Erosion Capability Farm of
Name Legend Class Phase Class Acres SMU
Webster sicl 107 A 1 IIw-1 45 144
Nicollet loam 55 A 1 I-l 25 80
Clarion loam 138 B 1 IIe-1 23 74
Clarion loam 138 C 2 IXIe-1 7 22
Van Buren County Farm
Principal Soil Association: Lindley-Keswick-Weller,
Location: Northwest Van Buren, Land Resource Area: 109,
River Basin: Des Moines River, Erosiveness Class: #6,
Gross farm size: 390 acres, Net farm size: 360 acres.
% Net Acres
Soil Type Soil Type Slope Erosion Capability Farm of
Name Legend Class Phase Class Acres SMU
Lindley loam 65 E 2 Vie 40 144
Pershing sil 131 B 1 lie 30 108
Weller sil 132 C 2 Ille 30 108
19
Table 1. (continued)
Jasper County Farm
Principal Soil Association: Tama-Muscatine,
Location: Northeast Jasper, Land Resource Area: 108,
River Basin: Skunk River, Erosiveness Class; ^/lO,
Gross farm size: 370, Net farm size: 340*
% Net Acres
Soil Type Soil Type Slope Erosion Capability Farm of
Name Legend Class Phase Class Acres SMU
Tama sic 1 120 C 2 IIIe-1 60 204
Downs sil 162 D 2 IIIe-3 20 68
Muscatine sicl 119 A 1 I-l 10 34
Shelby loam 24 E 2 IVe-1 10 34
Ida County Farm
Principal Soil Association: Monona--Ida-Hamburg,
Location: Southwestern Ida, Land Resource Area: 107,
River Basin: Western Iowa, Erosiveness Class : #10,
Gross farm size: 340 acres, Net farm size: 310 acres.
t Net Acres
Soil Type Soil Type Slope Erosion Capability Farm of
Name Legend Class Phase Class Acres SMU
Ida sil 1 D 3 Ille 15 47
Ida sil 1 E 3 IVe 30 93
Monona sil 10 C 2 lie 18 56
Monona sil 10 D 2 llle 17 52
Napier sil 12 C 1 Ille 20 62
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Activity and Data Descriptions
Various crop management systems made up of combinations of five
tillage systems, four supporting practices, and fifteen crop rotations
on the three to five SMUs are represented by the crop production
activities in the models* The five tillage systems were chosen such
that they represent a wide variation in degree of soil disturbance and
amount of plant residue left on the soil surface. They (and their
respective abbreviations used in the model summaries in Appendix A)
are, in order of low surface residue to high surface residue, (1) con
ventional fall moldboard plow (conv); (2) fall chisel plow (chisel);
(3) spring-disk (disk); (4) till-plant (till); and (5) slot-plant
(slot). The supporting practices (and their respective abbreviations)
that are modeled include contouring (contour), strip-cropping (strip),
terracing (terrace), and none (none). Grass waterways, although not
explicitly modeled, are assumed to be used in conjunction with other
supporting practices when needed.
The models represent cash crop farms, i.e. all crops are raised
and sold for cash. The crop rotations modeled include combinations of
corn, soybeans, oats, alfalfa, and pasture. Corn silage was not in
cluded in the rotations because it is seldom raised as a cash crop in
Iowa. In cases where a decisionmaker selects a rotation with alfalfa,
oats (straw), or pasture, it is assumed that some livestock production
activity exists that will purchase these inputs at the assumed prices.
21
The crop rotations included in this study are identified as follows:
1. C 5. CB
2. CCCOM 6. CCB
3. CCOMM 7. CBCOMM
4. COMMH 8. P
where: C Is corn grain; B is soybeans; 0 is oats; M is meadow
(alfalfa); and P is permanent pasture.
Crop management systems that include all combinations of the above
mentioned crop rotations, tillage systems, and supporting practices are
defined in the models with the following exceptions: (1) strip-cropping
is used for only the COMMM and CCOMM rotations; (2) only the conven
tional tillage system is used on pasture and pasture cannot be strip-
cropped or contoured; (3) till-plant and slot-plant systems are done on
the contour on SMUs of slope class Cor steeper; and (4) the till-plant
system is not used on the COMMM rotation.
Due to lack of substantial evidence showing consistently lower
yields on reduced tillage cropping systems, yields for the cropping
activities are assumed to be equal across all tillage systems and sup
porting practices for crops in a given rotation on a given SMU. Yields
used in the models are 1985 estimates derived from a statistical model
developed by Pope (1981) using time-series data. The projected 1985
yields for the various crops per SMU in the farms selected for this
study are given in Table 2.
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Table 2. Estimated 1985 crop yields for selected soils in Iowa
T*m
1985 Crop Yields
Farm
r ol Ul
Soil SMU Corn Soybeans Oats Meadow Pasture
County No. No. (bu./A) (bu./A) (bu./A) (tons/A) (AUM)
Boone 1 107A1 136 48 96 5.4 7.6
2 55A1 147 51 103 6.1 8.6
3 138B1 136 48 96 5.7 7.9
4 138C2 126 45 88 5.2 7.3
Van Buren 1 65E2 0 0 0 2.5 2.6
2 131B1 125 44 68 5.1 7.2
3 13202 106 37 58 4.4 5.7
Jasper 1 120C2 145 50 101 6.0 8.4
2 162D2 126 45 88 5.2 7.3
3 119A1 164 58 114 6.7 9.4
4 24E2 82 28 58 3.4 4.7
Ida 1 1D3 85 30 60 3.2 4.5
2 1E3 68 24 47 2.6 3.6
3 10C2 112 40 78 4.2 6.5
4 10D2 94 33 65 3.5 5.5
5 12C1 124 44 87 4.6 7.2
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Nitrogen fertilizer levels are based on corn yield levels,
sequence of corn in the rotation, and soil drainage characteristics.
Phosphorus and potassium fertilization rates are also based on crop
yields and represent "maintenance" levels. All fertilizer application
rates were developed with aid from Iowa State University agronomists.
Each cropping activity (representing one acre of a SMU) includes
machinery ownership costs and all operating input requirements or costs
(fertilizer, pesticides, fuel, seed, etc.). The niachinery ownership
costs (taxes, insurance, housing, and depreciation) and operating costs
(fuel, lubrication, and repairs) are calculated as per acre costs based
on machinery time requirements for each field operation in each crop
sequence of each rotation. A list of field operations for the crop
sequences corn following beans and beans following corn for the five
tillage systems is given in Tables 3 and 4- The machinery and equip
ment from which these costs are derived are considered an efficient
size for the sizes of farms modeled. Fuel requirements are assumed to
be 5 percent higher under contour farming compared to straight row
farming.
For each production activity representing a crop nianagement
system, soil erosion (movement) caused by rainfall is approximated
using the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE). This equation is
formulated as
A » R*K*L'S'C'P
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Table 3. Description of tillage systems for corn following beans
Field operation Conventional Chisel Disk
Till-
plant
Slot-
plant
Broadcast granular P & K X X X X X
Chisel plow (Fall) X X
X '^Anhydrous Ammonia X^
^b.a C jjb.C
X
Disk-harrow (Spring) X
Field cultivator X X
Offset disk (Spring) X
Plant, double disk openers X X
Plant, slot planter w/coulters X X
Plant, till-plant X
Pre-emergence herbicide^ X X X X X
Sweep cultivation 2X
Rolling cultivaton 2X 2X 2X 1.5X
Harvest X X X X X
^Fall.
^ust have rolling coulters on applicator.
•^Spring.
^Depends on herbicide program.
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Table 4. Description of tillage systems for beans following corn
Till- Slot-
Field operation Conventional Chisel Disk plant plant
Shred stalks (Fall) X
Disk stalks (Fall) X
Moldboard plow (Fall) X
Chisel plow (Fall) X
Disk-harrow (Spring) X X
Field cultivator (Spring) X
Offset disk (Spring) X
Plant, double disk openers X
Plant, slot-planter w/coulters X X X
Plant, till-planter X
Pre-emergence herbicide^ X X X X X
Sweep cultivation 2X
Rolling cultivation 2X 2X 2X 1.5X
Harvest X X X X X
^Depends on herbicide program.
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where A > average annual soil loss in tons per acre,
R « rainfall factor,
K = soil erodibility factor,
L = slope length factor,
S = slope gradient factor,
C = cropping and Tnanagement factor, and
P = conservation or supporting practice factor.
For more information on how these factors are used and calculated see
Wischmeier and Smith (1978).
Purchasing activities supply off-farm inputs such as capital,
hired labor, fuel, fertilizers, and pesticides to the crop production
activities. Selling activities provide income to the decisionmaker
from his selected cropping activities. Input and output prices
represent 1980 price levels. These prices are listed in Table 5.
For a complete discussion of the models and details on prices, soil
loss coefficients, and other data used in this study see Pope, Bhide,
and Heady (1982a). These models are used as tools to aid in analyzing
effects of tenure and capital constraints on economics of soil and water
conservation practices in Iowa- The models are solved under various
scenarios reflecting different leasing arrangements, capital con
straints, soil erosion restrictions, and assumptions about farmers*
willingness and ability to use various soil and water conservation prac
tices. These scenarios and discussions of the model solution results
will be elaborated on in the following chapters.
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Table 5. Input and output prices
Item
Fertilizer
Fuel
Nitrogen (anhydrous ammonia:
Phosphorus (super phosphate:
Potassium (muriate of potash:
Diesel
LP gas
Other Inputs
Hired labor
Capital
Crops Corn grain
Soybeans
Oats
Straw
Alfalfa
Pasture
Price
paid
Unit ($/unit)
82% N) lb. 0.14
45% P2O5) lb, 0.27
60% K2O) lb. 0.12
gal. 1.29
gal. 0.686
hrs. 4.50
dollars 0.15
bu. —
bu. —
bu. —
ton —
ton —
AUM
Price
received
($/unit)
2.56
7.30
1.56
50.00
57.73
8.00
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CHAPTER III. TENURE EFFECTS ON ECONOMICS OF SOIL AND WATER
CONSERVATION PRACTICES
Owner-operatorship is only one means of obtaining and allocating
resources in the crop production process. A large portion of Iowa farms
obtain control of agricultural resources through some form of leasing
arrangement. Many of these leasing arrangements are based on custom or
are formulated in local "leasing" markets under conditions of less than
perfect competition. Such leases undoubtedly influence the efficiency
with which the resources employed within them are allocated. This chap
ter focuses on how tenure can be expected to affect the allocation of
these available resources that comprise the various soil and water con
servation practices and how that allocation affects soil erosion.
Literature Review
Several regression analyses have been done using data from a USDA
national land ownership survey (Lewis, 1980) in attempts to relate land
owner and tenure classes to soil erosion levels and investments in such
soil conserving measures as terracing, grass waterways, and gully con
trols during the three year period 1975 to 1977. Baron (1981) found in
his analysis that in most of the areas he observed owner—operators and
owners who leased their land on share terms were more likely to invest
in soil conserving practices than owners who leased their land on cash
terms. Lee, (1980) using similar cross sectional data, found that for
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full operators (those who operate only land that they own) higher Income
levels were associated with lower rates of erosion nationally and within
five out of ten regions that she studied in the United States, appar
ently because they farmed less erosive land and used more conservation
practices. However, she found no difference In soil erosion as neasured
by the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) between tenure groups at the
national level or between most regions. She also found no significant
difference in mean soil losses between different types of ownership
groups (corporations, partnerships, proprietorships, etc.). Where dif
ferences existed at regional levels, they were mostly attributable to
physical (more erosive soils) rather than management factors. Lee con
cluded that as a group, landlords do not automatically appear to have
higher levels of soil erosion than owner-operators or those who combine
landlord, tenant, and owner-operator functions. In another stu<fy uti
lizing the same data sources, Otte (1982) found that type of owner was
related to soil erosion levels.
Perhaps the few above discrepancies in data analyses findings
result from the generality of such broad surveys. An important fact
apparent in the data was that very few of the respondents reported
investing in any of the soil conservation practices during the three
year period (Schertz and Wunderlich, 1982).
Many tenure—soil erosion studies have focused on specific regions
or soil association areas. In a series of studies conducted at Iowa
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State University, tenure problems and owner resistance to conservation
practices were found to be present on highly erosive sample farms in a
western Iowa "land base laboratory" (Frey, 1952; Held and Timmons, 1958;
Blase and Timmons, 1961; Hauser, 1976). In the most recent study,
Hauser found, using analysis of variance, that strictly owner-operators
were averaging five tons annual soil loss per acre less than strictly
renter-operators. He also found that expected length of tenure was
negatively associated with soil erosion (longer expectancy, less ero
sion) but that the stipulation of conservation investment cost-sharing
in the lease didn't affect soil loss levels.
Ervin (1981) used a similar sample method to study tenure effects
on soil erosion on potentially erosive farns in Monroe County, Missouri.
He, like Hauser, found soil erosion as measured by the USLE to be sig
nificantly greater on rented farms than on owner-operated farms. To
strengthen this finding, he found that the higher erosion rates on
rented farms were produced on soils less erosion prone than soils farmed
by owner-operators. This implied lower levels of soil conservation
efforts on the rented lands. Ervin also concluded that significantly
more owner-operated land in the sample had terraces, grass waterways,
contour farming, and crop rotations with h^ or pasture than the rented
farms. He found little significant difference in the percentage of
owned and rented farms where conservation tillage was utilized, and
speculated that its use was perhaps based more on cost considerations
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rather than or in addition to erosion control benefits. Ervln used
regression analysis to test for significant statistical associations
between erosion losses and several tenure factors hypothesized to
affect erosion. He found that lease length, type of lease (cash,
share, or both), and total acres rented were not associated with soil
erosion levels in the study area. He did find strong significance of
physical erosion potential and fairly good significance of conservation
investment cost-sharing provisions in the lease in explaining soil
erosion rates.
Kraft (1978) conducted a survey of 31 dairy farmers on four soil
associations in Ontario County, New York. He found that all 31 farmers
managed rented land differently than their own land. Farmers who could
not obtain long-term leases on rented land tended to exploit or mine it
by raising continuous corn for four to six years, not practicing strip
cropping, and not raising alfalfa. Kraft found that once the farmers
purchased land they formerly rented, they would change rotations to keep
forages on the steeper slopes and shorter corn rotations on the leveler
parcels. They would also invest more heavily in fertilizer, lime, and
drainage.
Hoover and Wiitila (1980) analyzed responses from 106 sample oper
ators and 69 landlords in the erosion prone Maple Creek watershed in
northeast Nebraska. They found a large discrepancy between the Soil
Conservation Service estimates of soil erosion hazard on farms and
operator and landlord views of the soil erosion problems on their farms.
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The main reason given by sample operators for not using various soil
and water conserving practices was landlord objection. Other important
reasons were machine difficulties (e.g., point rows), extra work in
volved, and too low of cost-sharing levels offered the public
agencies. Hoover and Wiitila stated that "whereas the SCS measures
soil erosion problems in terms of amount of soil movement, operators
tend to classify the problems according to visible soil movement and
short-run effects of soil erosion on the economic, physical, and opera
tional aspects of farming" (p. iv).
In a study utilizing cropping budgets, conservation practices
under crop-share leases were found to reduce landlord income (Jensen,
Heady and Baumann, 1955).
Resource Allocation Theory Applied to Leasing
Economic theory suggests that, under conditions of perfect compe
tition, the resources owned and managed by a single decisionmaker,
whose objective is to maximize profits, are allocated in agricultural
production in a cost efficient fashion. Heady (1955) has theorized
that for a crop-share lease to be potentially as efficient as produc
tion and resource allocation under owner-operatorship the following
four conditions must be fulfilled by the lease contract: (1) costs (at
least direct variable costs) must be shared in the same proportion as
production (output) is shared for each particular crop; (2) the shares
of all competitive crops must be the same; (3) allowing for normal
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yield and price uncertainties, the prospects for returns on investments
over tine must be the same under the share lease as in its absence; and
(4) the output received by each party must represent the product of the
respective resources contributed by each. Condition (3) might be
attained by guaranteeing compensation to the tenant for unexhausted
investment should he leave before realizing its full returns or by set
ting the lease length for a period long enough that the tenant would
realize full returns on his share of investment. Condition (4) is
guaranteed by condition (1) for any resources for which costs are
shared in exact proportion to the output share. Condition (4) applies
to the specialized resources that each party of the lease contributes
individually (e.g.» land by the landlord, machinery by the tenant).
This last condition is at best only approximated in most leasing situa
tions .
Since a cash renter realizes the full crop outputs from his con
tribution of non-land production resources, and the cash rent repre
sents a fixed cost to him and a fixed return to the landlord, the
tenant and landlord have no conflicts in sharing costs and outputs in
the short-run. Perhaps the more important problem in arranging an
efficient cash lease is setting "fair" rents such that condition (4) is
satisfied. Also, factors such as risk associated with the large fixed
rental payment and short-run benefits to the renter from exploiting the
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landlord*s land may cause inefficiencies in resource allocation and use
by the cash tenant.
The following analysis will focus on how different cost-sharing
and crop output-sharing arrangements representing different crop-share
leases affect selections of soil and water conservation practices as
compared to selections of the owner-operator under various soil erosion
level restrictions. There is little need to analyze variations of con
dition (2) as present crop-share leases in Iowa generally stipulate
that competitive cash crops are to be shared in the same proportion.
It is assumed that lease lengths are for a long enough period that all
parties can realize full returns on their shares of any investments
they make. For example, machinery ownership costs and terrace instal
lation costs are represented in the models as annualized costs. Also,
multi-year rotations such as CBCOMM are represented in the models as
single period cropping activities. Inefficiencies resulting from any
types of risks or uncertainties are not incorporated in the models.
For purposes of this study, a short-run situation is assumed in
that farm sizes are fixed, i.e. the owner-operator or landlord has a
fixed amount of land to farm or rent out. From the tenant's perspec
tive, he has the opportunity to rent that fixed amount of land from the
landlord. This would not preclude his renting additional land in real
ity; however the objectives of the study can be attained by assuming
that a fixed amount of land is available.
35
Normally In a short-run situation the owner-operator and tenants
have a fixed machinery complement. As modeled in this study, machinery
costs are specified per cropping activity (on a per acre basis). All
operators are allowed to "choose" different machine complements (repre
senting different tillage methods) based on their profitability in each
different scenario for which the LP models are solved.
Modeled Leasing Arrangements
Basically, three different tenure arrangements are modeled in this
study. One is the owner-operator who pays all costs and receives all
crop outputs. His scenario numbers are followed ty the letter A in the
model summaries in Appendix A, (All land charges are essentially fixed
costs that bear no influence on crop management system decisions to the
extent they can be met—they are therefore ignored in this analysis.)
The other two are crop-share leases prevalent in Iowa and will be
described below. A cash leasing arrangement was not explicitly modeled
in this study. Since the cash renter views his per acre cash rent as a
fixed cost and also pays all variable costs and receives all product
(output), his selections of crop management systems would match those
of the owner-operator under equivalent scenarios on three conditions:
(1) his per acre fixed rents are at levels below the net returns per
acre per SMU realized by the owner-operator, (2) his operating capital
availability over and above his fixed rents are at least as great as
that of the owner-operator, and (3) he is guaranteed compensation for
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unexhausted investments. It is quite realistic to assume that condition
(1) is satisfied. Condition (2) is also satisfied in this chapter as
capital is assumed to be unlimited. In this analysis, condition (3) is
assumed to be met.
The first crop-share lease to be defined will be referred to as the
50-50 lease. This lease is one of the more prevalent leases in Iowa in
which some of the variable input costs are shared between landlord and
tenant in proportion to their sharing of output. Under this arrangement
the landlord contributes his land and 50 percent of the costs of fertil
izer, herbicides, insecticide, seed, and the drying of corn grain. He
receives 50 percent of all crop outputs (corn grain, soybeans, oats,
straw, alfalfa, and pasture) as return to his land and capital contribu
tions. This landlord will hereafter be referred to as the 50-50
landlord—a letter"C" follows his scenario numbers in the model solution
summaries in Appendix A.
Under this lease arrangement the tenant contributes 50 percent of
the costs of fertilizer, herbicides, insecticide, seed, and the drying
of corn grain, all labor, and all machinery and machine related costs.
He also receives 50 percent of the crop outputs as return on his capi
tal, labor, and managerial abilities. This tenant will be referred to
as the "50-50 tenant"—a "B" follows his scenario numbers in Appendix A.
The second crop-share lease that is modeled will be referred to as
the 35-65 lease. Under this leasing arrangement the landlord
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furnishes only his land for the production of crop outputs, of which he
receives 35 percent as return on his land. This landlord will here
after be referred to as the 0-35 landlord, meaning he pays no operating
costs and receives 35 percent of the crop outputs as a variable share
rent. An "E" follows the scenario numbers for this landlord in the
model solution summaries in Appendix A.
Under this same lease arrangement, the tenant pays all machinery
and variable cropping costs and supplies all labor; he receives 65 per
cent of the crop outputs as return on his labor, capital, and mana
gerial abilities. This tenant will be referred to as the 100-65 tenant
(he pays all costs and receives 65 percent of the crop outputs)—the
letter "D" follows his scenario numbers in Appendix A.
A diagrammatical representation of the costs and revenues associ
ated with a particular crop production activity in the linear program
ming models will help illustrate why different activities may be viewed
as "most profitable" by the owner-operator and the various leasing
parties. For purposes of comparison, all parties are assumed to have
unlimited capital.
Figure 2 represents the costs and revenues for a particular crop
production activity for the owner operator and various lease parties.
The areas inside the solid rectangles represent the costs (C) paid and
revenues (R) received by each farm operator from his share of output.
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The total areas below the dashed lines (inclusive of any enclosed areas)
represent total costs paid and revenues received ty the owner operator.
R
a.
owner-operator
R
b.
cash renter
r
I
r—I
R
c.
R
d.
50-50 share lease 35-65 share lease
Figure 2. Divisions of costs and revenues for an owner-operator and
parties of various leasing arrangements for a typical crop
production activity in a linear programming model
In Figure 2a area C represents the total non-land production costs
for a given crop management system that the owner-operator must pay to
obtain gross revenues of area R. Given unlimited capital the owner-
operator chooses the crop production activity (one acre of a particular
SMU under a particular crop management system) for which R-C is
greatest. The cash renter (represented by Figure 2b) must p^ all costs
incurred the owner-operator, in addition to a fixed per acre cash
rent (the area above the dashed line in area C) and receives the same
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total revenues, area R. The cash renter also selects cropping activities
with the largest net returns (R minus the solid rectangle C). Since the
cash rent represents a fixed outlay, the cash renter chooses the same
crop production activities as the owner-operator provided R > C by an
amount greater than the opportunity cost of his labor and management.
Since the landlord receives the area of C above the dashed line as a
fixed rent, there are no conflicts between landlord and tenant in farm
planning.
Figure 2c represents the corresponding costs and returns of the same
cropping activity for the 50-50 tenant arrangement as modeled in this
study. Here solid rectangle C represents the tenant's costs which are
always less than the full non-land costs of the owner-operator since cer
tain costs are shared "50-50" with the landlord. This tenant receives
exactly half of the returns received by the owner-operator for the given
cropping activity. Since this tenant as modeled also will choose crop
ping activities based on his largest net return (area R-C in 2c) there is
every possibility that he may find a different cropping activity more
profitable than that which is most profitable to the owner-operator. (In
fact, several activities may be unprofitable to him.) In Figure 2c the
landlord's variable costs are represented by the dashed-in area above C;
his revenues are the dashed-in half of the gross revenues. Since he is
also maximizing net returns (his share of revenues minus his share of
costs), there is no reason why he should find the same cropping activity
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as Chose selected by the tenant or the owner-operator to be most prof
itable. It Is easy to see in Figure 2c that the closer total costs come
to being shared "50-50", the more compatible the landlord and tenant
will become in farm planning, and the closer their farm plan will match
that of the owner-operator.
Figure 2d represents the 35-65 leasing arrangement modeled in this
study. The 100-65 tenant pays the same total cropping costs as does
the owner-operator; however, he receives only 65 percent of the total
revenues. Depending on the relationship between costs and revenues for
a given cropping activity, this tenant may find that an activity other
than that selected by the owner-operator is most profitable to him.
Many activities that are profitable to the owner-operator may be unprof
itable to this tenant (if C > R in 2d). Since the landlord pays no
cropping costs and receives 35 percent of the crop outputs, he will sim
ply desire the activity with the greatest gross revenue (the dashed-in
area above R in 2d). Such division of costs and revenues can obviously
lead to tenant and landlord incompatibility and farm plans quite dif
ferent from those of an owner-operator.
As discussed above, even under conditions of unlimited capital
availability the various lease parties may select crop management sys
tems that are different from each other and the owner-operator because
of the ways costs and revenues are shared. Under conditions of various
soil erosion level restrictions, the tenure farm plans may diverge even
further. This divergence will be pointed out in the discussion section
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below. Models representing all four farms, all three tenure arrange
ments (owner-operator, 50-50 crop-share, and 35-65 crop-share), and all
tenure parties as decisionmakers will be solved under the following
scenarios.
Scenario Descriptions
Under scenario one the objective of all tenure parties is to maxi
mize 1985 before-tax net returns with total disregard to soil erosion.
It is assumed that the decisionmakers are able or willing to use only
the conventional fall moldboard plow system.
Scenario two is identical to scenario one except that the decision-
makers are assumed to be able and willing to use all crop management
systems modeled.
Scenario three assumes that the decisionmakers are able and willing
to use all crop management systems; however, they must maximize 1985
before-tax net returns subject to the constraint that soil movement as
measured by the USLE cannot exceed T-values on any acre of the farm. It
is assumed that the land owners pay all terrace installation and main
tenance costs. One solution is solved for the 50-50 tenant for each of
the Jasper and Van Buren county farms where he assumes all terrace main
tenance costs. This is done to see if it is profitable for a tenant to
assume terrace maintenance costs. No other tenant ntodels are solved
under this scenario as they would adopt terracing activities consis
tently if no terracing costs are paid by them.
A2
Scenario four is the same as scenario three except that here land
owners and tenants must each pay 50 percent of the terrace installation
costs. The terrace maintenance costs are borne by the parties in the
same manner as the shared costs. For example, the 100-65 tenant pays
all, the 50-50 tenant pays half, etc.
Scenario five assumes that the decisionmaker maximizes 1985 net
returns subject to the condition that he is taxed (or places a negative
value of) $0.50 a ton on soil movement as measured by the USLE. Again
all crop management systems are available to the decisonmakers.
Scenarios six and seven are exactly the same as scenario five
except that soil movement is valued at $1.00 and $3.00 a ton, respec
tively. The last three scenarios were run for the leasing parties on
the Jasper and Van Buren county farms only.
Solution summaries of all models representing various tenure
arrangements and scenarios are given in Appendix A.
Results and Discussion
In scenario one, soil erosion losses are totally disregarded and
the decisionmaker is allowed to maximize net returns assuming he is
willing or able to use only the conventional fall moldboard plow til
lage system. Under such conditions corn-soybean (CB) rotations with
straight-row farming are generally most profitable for the owner-
operator. On some of the more erosive soils, corn and soybean yields
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are low enough in relation to production costs that pasture or a corn-
oats-meadow-meadow-meadow (COMMM) rotation are the most profitable.
The 50-50 tenant solutions are similar to the owner-operator solu
tions except that on even more of the erosive, less productive soils
the COMMM and pasture rotations are more profitable for the tenant than
the CB rotation. The slope E SMU on the Van Buren farm is taken out of
production entirely by this tenant.
The 100-65 tenant solutions vary even further from the owner-
operator solutions on some of the farms. All D and E slope SMUs are
put into a COMMM rotation or go out of production entirely. The corn
and soybean yields simply are not great enough to make this tenant*8
share of returns pay for the total costs associated with the CB rota
tion on these SMUs.
Both landlords are somewhat incompatible (the 0-35 landlord more-
so) with their tenants in that the CB rotation is generally most prof
itable for them on most SMUs. Erosion levels for the landlords and
owner-operator model solutions are extremely high on the more erosive
farms, as the CB conventional tillage crop management system is a very
erosive cropping activity. The soil movement levels In the 50-50 ten
ant solutions are less than, or equal to, those in the owner-operator
solutions. For the 100—65 tenant, soil erosion is even less, as more
COMMM and pasture activities are selected in the optimal solution.
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The tenure party incompatibilities and lower soil erosion levels
for the two tenants may be overstated in this scenario for two reasons:
(1) tenants are not allowed to choose lower fertilizer levels on the CB
rotations; and (2) in the model summaries land that is taken out of pro
duction is assumed to have soil erosion levels of zero.
Soil and Water Conservation Practice Profitability
In scenario two, the tenure parties are allowed to choose from all
modeled crop management systems in maximizing 1985 before-tax net re
turns. Under this scenario, the CB rotation, with till-plant tillage
and contouring on slopes C and steeper, is generally the most profitable
crop-management system for all farm operators. The 50-50 tenant is very
nearly indifferent as to selection of the till- or slot-plant tillage
systems. The till-plant system requires less herbicides, but more
diesel and machinery and repair costs Chan the slot-plant system (see
Table 6 for a cost-returns breakdown for three rotations and the five
tillage systems for SMU 120C2)- Since the 50-50 tenant shares the her
bicide costs with his landlord, his choice between the till- and slot-
plant system depends on the relative costs of the shared and non-shared
items mentioned above.
The cost savings of the till- and slot-plant systems over the con
ventional moldboard plow system allow both tenants to raise more acres
of CB rotations than in scenario one. Still, the most erosive prone and
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least productive soils are taken out of production or put into COMMM or
pasture (moreso by the 100-65 tenant) by both tenants.
The CB rotations also are most profitable for both landlords under
this scenario. The 50-50 landlord is generally indifferent to which
tillage system is used except the slot-plant system since it requires
more pesticides. In the solution summaries, it is assumed he chooses
the tillage system (other than slot-plant) that is compatible with that
most profitable to the tenant for the commonly selected rotations. The
0-35 landlord is totally indifferent to the tillage system since he
pays no costs; he is also assumed to select the tillage system compat
ible with his tenant's selections in the solution summaries.
Given the ability and willingness to adopt conservation practices
such as the till-and slot-plant tillage systems practiced on the con
tour on slopes C and greater, all tenure parties receive as great or
greater net returns as under the strictly conventional fall plow sys
tem. Also, the increased surface residue left by these tillage systems
greatly reduces the erosion levels on soils in a CB rotation (see
Appendix C). The economies of the slot- and till-plant systems also
allow a higher degree of lease party compatibility with respect to crop
rotations.
In no cases does strip cropping or terracing enter these solutions
in which soil erosion levels are not constrained.
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Soil and Water Conservation Practice Selection
Under T-Value Restrictions
In scenarios three and four, the operators and landlords use
all available crop management systems to maximize 1985 before-tax net
returns subject to a constraint that soil erosion levels cannot exceed
T-vali^s. Scenario four assumes that all landowners and operators must
pay 50 percent of terrace installation costs (the remainder is assumed
to be subsidized by the other leasing party or the public) for any crop
management systems selected that include terracing. The terrace main
tenance costs are shared exactly as each party would share fertilizer
and pesticide costs. Scenario three assumes the landowners must pay
all terrace costs. This scenario is solved only for the landowners who
selected terracing activities under the 50 percent subsitfy in scenario
four. Obviously landowners who do not use terracing when subsidized by
50 percent will not use terracing when they must pay all costs associ
ated with it. Scenario three is also modeled for the 50-50 tenant only
on the Jasper and Van Buren county farms. It is assumed that this ten
ant pays only terrace maintenance costs. No tenant solutions were
solved for which the tenant pays no terracing costs, as he would select
many terracing activities that the landlord would not find profitable.
Under T-value restrictions COMMM and corn-soybean-corn-oats-
meadow-meadow (CBCOMM) rotations under slot-plant tillage and contour
ing on SMUs of Cslope or steeper are the roost profitable crop manage-
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ment systems for all operators and the 50-50 landlord. All E slope
soils are taken out of production when all terracing costs must be paid
by the landowner. The solutions for the 50-50 landlord are compatible
with those of the 50-50 tenant except that it is more profitable for
the landlord to have the COMMM rotations stripcropped under conven
tional tillage since this crop management system also achieves T-
value and his herbicide costs are lower than for the slot-plant contour
system. This presents no insurmountable problems in reality, as only
half of the herbicide costs are involved.
Under T-value restrictions the parties of the 35-65 lease are very
incompatible, reflecting the landlord's total disassociaton with costs.
Continuous corn (C) under slot- or till-planting and contouring and
corn-corn-oats-meadow-meadow (CCOMM) under slot-or till-planting and
strip cropping on the more erosive soils are most profitable for the
0—35 landlord. The landlord's farm plans are much less profitable (or
even unprofitable) to the 100-65 tenant than the more meadow-intensive
rotations the tenant prefers to produce (see Appendix C).
Given a 50 percent subsidy for terrace installation costs, terrac
ing is profitable to landowners on only SMU 24E2 on the Jasper County
farm. On this SMU, terracing allows the landowner to raise COMMM with
slot-planting on the contour at a "marginal" net return ($21.l4/acre
for the owner-operator) with the 50 percent subsidy. Even a 50 percent
terrace installation subsidy will not allow a tenant to install ter
races profitably. The model summaries for which the 50-50 tenant
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assuiaes terrace maintenance costs indicate that a tenant can profitably
bear such costs on erosive soils that are fairly productive.
In all cases, the imposition of the T-value restrictions reduces
net returns to the tenure party and/or the equivalent whole farm net re
turns for the selected farm plans as compared to the solutions of sce
nario two. The magnitude of the reduction varies in proportion to the
amount of erosive soils on the farm; net returns are reduced by as much
as 30 percent for tenure parties on the highly erosive Ida County farm.
This is a result of the adoption of more meadow-intensive rotations
under the herbicide intensive slot-plant tillage system and also taking
more land out of production. It is clear that levels of cost-sharing
higher than 50 percent on terrace installations are necessary to allow
profitable production of corn-soybean rotations on most slopes C and
steeper under T-value restrictions. Also, the slot-and till-plant sys
tems in conjuction with contouring on slopes C and steeper are the most
economical and effective systems in meeting these restrictions.
Soil Loss Taxes and Economics of Soil and Water
Conservation Practices
In scenarios five, six, and seven, the tenure parties are assumed
Co maximize 1985 before-tax net returns subject to per acre soil loss
taxes of $.50, $1«00, and $3.00, respectively. All modeled crop manage
ment systems are available to the decisionmakers. These scenarios are
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modeled for the owner-operator on all farms and for the leasing parties
on the Jasper and Van Buren county farms.
Under a $.50 soil loss tax the decisionmakers generally use slot-
planting (and contouring on slopes C and steeper) on SMUs under a CB
rotation if soil loss is six tons (or more) less than that under the
till-plant system (there is a trade-off between the tax and the herbi
cide costs which are about $3.00 more for the slot-plant than the
till-plant systems under the CB rotation). The 50-50 tenant needs lit
tle incentive to switch from till- to slot-plant systems on any of the
SMUs (refer to sensitivity section). On some of the more erosive soils
COMMM becomes more profitable than the CB rotation under the $,50 tax
as it has a lower soil erosion level and a fairly high net return.
Again, the 0-35 landlord's desired farm plan diverges from that of his
tenant; continuous com rotations are more profitable for him under the
$.50 tax than the more meadow intensive rotations.
Under scenarios six and seven, all operators and the 50-50 land
lord continue to adopt more meadow intensive rotations, generally under
slot—plant tillage. On some SMUs, a chisel—plow system is more profit
able for the 50-50 landlord than the slot-plant tillage system if the
soil movement levels are similar, since his share of the herbicide
costs are less under the former system. He and his tenant are other
wise compatible except that production on the most erosive slopes may
be unprofitable for the tenant. Continuous corn rotations remain nest
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profitable for the 0-35 landlord, until at the $3.00 tax the COMMM
rotations tecome more profitable on his more erosive soils.
It is apparent (see Appendix A) that when the tenants or the 50-50
landlord are solely burdened with the entire soil loss tax, it is more
profitable for them to adopt more meadow intensive rotations than the
owner-operator does under the same tax rate.
Taxes are an effective means to reduce soil erosion levels; they
also reduce net returns. As can be seen in Appendix C, the $.50 tax
reduces soil movement from the levels of scenario two by 60 to 85 per
cent (depending on who is the decisionmaker) for the three more erosive
farms. This tax generally reduces net returns and the counterpart's
equivalent net returns (e.g., the landlord's net returns corresponding
to the farm plan selected by his tenant) by three to eight percent from
corresponding net returns in scenario two. The magnitude of the reduc
tion corresponds to the erosiveness of the farm. The $3.00 soil move
ment tax generally reduces soil losses to T-values and reduces net re
turns by 15 percent or more for the more erosive farms. Taxing the
tenant appears to result in farm plans more consistent with those of
the owner-operator. On both the Jasper and Van Buren county farms, the
landlord suffers no reduction in net returns from the tenant's farm
plan in scenario two when the tenant is taxed at the $.50/ton rate.
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Sensitivity of the Tenure Models
Tables showing the sensitivity of costs and prices for the tenure
models under scenario two are given in Appendix B. These tables show
the activity level, Input cost (valise appearing in the objective func
tion for that activity) and the range of the input cost for which the
level of that activity will remain unchanged in the solutions of sce
nario two. For example, the upper cost for an input (e.g., buy nitro
gen) or a production activity (e.g., CB, till-plant, contour, 120C2)
represents the largest negative value (since it is a cost) that can oc
cur in the objective function without changing the level of the activ
ity in the solution. In the selling activities, (e.g., sell corn
grain) the "costs" are positive (negative costs) since they represent
revenues. The upper cost, therefore, represents the lowest price, and
the lower cost represents the highest price, that can occur in the ob
jective function without changing the level of that selling activity.
Any narrow range of upper and lower costs or one of either costs
very close in value to the input cost indicates that this activity is
sensitive to costs and prices. Insensitive activities would indicate
that the models are more applicable to a wide range of cost and price
scenarios than if they are very sensitive.
In general, the owner-operator models indicate some degree of sen
sitivity between the till- and slot-plant systems, i.e., they generally
differ in cost by about $3.00 for a corn-soybean rotation. The remain
ing tillage systems display even less sensitivity, e.g., approximately
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$13,00 difference between conventional and till-plant systems and $8.00
difference between chisel-plow and till-plant systems. Most of the
inputs display fairly moderate sensitivity, except, for example, diesel
fuel on the Jasper County farm and medium term capital on the Van Buren
County farm which appear to be more sensitive to prices. Also, output
prices display fair insensitiveness except on the Van Buren county farm
where the upper costs on corn and soybean selling activities are fairly
close to the objective function values.
The 50-50 tenant's cropping practices, in general, are extremely
sensitive to herbicide costs, diesel, and capital costs, reflecting the
sensitivity between the till- and slot-plant tillage sytems. As men
tioned previously, this is a result of the sharing of herbicide costs
and the fact that the slot-plant system requires more herbicides and
less diesel and machine and repair costs than the till-plant system. In
general, the 50-50 tenant's cropping systems are as, or less, sensitive
to other costs and output prices than the owner-operator solutions.
The apparent sensitivity of the production activities to costs in
the 50-50 landlord models results from the fact that his costs are the
same for all tillage systems except the slot-plant system. These model
solutions appear to be no more sensitive to input and output prices than
the owner-operator solutions.
In general, the 100-65 tenant's cropping systems appear no more
sensitive to costs with respect to tillage systems than do those of the
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owner-operator, since this tenant also pays all costs. The COMMM,
slot-plant, contour activity on SMU 2AK2 on the Jasper County farm is
very sensitive because the costs are identical to the same rotation and
tillage activity under the strip cropping supporting practice. The
tenant's model solutions are naturally more sensitive to output prices
than are those of the owner-operator because the 100-65 tenant is re
ceiving only 65 percent of the total product.
Conclusions
Several studies have associated higher levels of soil erosion with
leased land. This study indicates that, given certain assumptions on
cost and returns sharing, in many instances it may be profitable for a
tenant to farm in a less erosive manner than an owner-operator.
The least intensive tillage systems are most profitable for ten
ants as well as owner-operators. On the more erosive soils analyzed,
tenants may also have higher net returns from meadow-intensive rota
tions than from the CB rotations which are most profitable to an
owner-operator. Under the customary cost and returns sharing arrange
ments in Iowa, production on the most erosive soils may be unprofitable
for a tenant. Of course farmers would not be inclined to rent highly
erosive soils unless they come in a package with less erosive soils.
This analysis indicates that terracing, even when subsidized at
the 50 percent level, is seldom profitable for an owner-operator. It
is no more profitable for the landlord as an individual, and extremely
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unprofitable for a tenant alone. Adopting less erosive rotations are
generally more profitable for tenants under T-value restrictions or
soil loss taxes. It may, however, be profitable for tenants to share
some terracing costs on fairly productive soils.
Of course, under ideal leasing arrangements which satisfy the pre
viously mentioned conditions, the subsidy necessary to induce adoption
of terracing by the leasing parties would match that of the owner-
operator. This study indicates that cost-sharing above the 50 percent
level is necessary to make terracing a profitable activity for any
landowner and/or operator on most erosive soils.
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CHAPTER IV. EFFECTS OF CAPITAL CONSTRAINTS AND COSTS ON USE
OF SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION PRACTICES
Borrowing has long been an important source of capital for farmers
(Brake and Melichar, 1977). Because of increases in prices of land and
conventional farm inputs and the adoption of new labor saving technolo
gies, liabilities of the farming sector increased from §53 billion in
1970 to $174,6 billion in 1981, an increase of 229 percent (USDA, 1982).
The models of the previous chapter assumed that the owner-operator
and leasing parties could borrow unlimited amounts of capital at a 15
percent annual interest rate under an environment of "certainty". There
are many instances in reality in which a landowner or operator may for
some reason use levels of non-real estate capital lower than levels used
in the previous chapters.
Basically there are two reasons why a farmer may not borrow or use
an amount of capital that would approximately equate its marginal costs
with marginal returns (Heady, 1952). The first is the degree of risk
aversion inherent in the individual and the rate of discount he psycho
logically attributes to future returns based upon his perceptions of risk
and uncertainty. Restricted capital usage resulting from a farmer's risk
averseness or other choice criteria is called internal capital rationing.
The second reason is that capital may be rationed to the farmer by credit
firms or sources, referred to as external capital rationing. External
capital rationing generally reflects the risk response of the credit firm
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to the same risks and uncertainties that the farmer faces, in addition to
risk associated with the farmer as a manager and borrower. It m£i^ also
result from unavailability of capital in the money markets at the bank
level.
Baker (1968), and Barry and Baker (1971) have developed the "credit
reserve" concept as one explanation of wty farmers internally ration cap
ital. They have described a credit reserve as the difference between
capital limits imposed external credit rationing and the amount actu
ally borrowed by the individual farmer. Such credit reserves are viewed
by farmers as a source of liquidity and pl^ a role very similar to
insurance in managing farm business risk. Like insurance, a credit
reserve has costs and benefits associated with it. The costs are the
expected benefits foregone by not utilizing the credit which is main
tained as a reserve. The benefits are the liquidity the reserve provides
to the firm.
Recently, the original Barry and Baker portfolio-analysis model has
been expanded to account for credit risks, such as variability in
interest rates and loan fund availability at rural banks, that farmers
have been subjected to from the mid-70s to the present (Barry, Baker, and
Sanint, 1981), These authors conclude that credit risk, in the same
manner as commodity price and yield risks, in most circumstances leads a
risk-averse farmer to less debt usage than when his credit availability
and costs are certain.
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Research has also been done on factors Influencing external capi
tal rationing. In general a farmer's creditworthiness, based on such
things as asset values, income and repayment potential, management and
personal characteristics, as well as lender preferences (e.g., equip
ment vs. livestock loans) and overall capital availability in the
financial markets, determine the extent of external credit rationing
imposed upon the farmer by lending institutions. Such financial factors
are often translated into "rule-of-thumb" credit limits such as
lenders' willingness to loan up to 75 percent of farmland's current
market value, to loan up to 75 percent of a crop's expected sale value,
and to aim for an overall debt-equity ratio not to exceed 1.0. Also,
the orders in which loans for particular types of items and from dif
ferent sources are obtained are important in determining the amount of
credit a farmer may obtain (Irwin and Baker, 1962). For example, the
farmer can generally obtain more credit if cattle are financed before
machinery, and also by going to the Production Credit Association (PCA)
before merchants and dealers. Sonka, Dixon, and Jones (1980), using a
lender survey-case study approach, found that the borrower's net worth
and income-generating potential are major determinants of credit-
generating capacity. They also found that short-term equity (current
assets minus current liabilities) and the farmer's leverage ratio
(debt/net worth) also are determinants, but that the degree to which
these factors affect credit-generating capacity depend on the degree of
"conservatism" or "liberalism" inherent in the lender. Barry, Baker,
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and Sanint (1981) also used a lender survey analysis to study credit
risks that farners may be subjected to by lenders. They found that
operating credit appears more stable than capital credit, but that re
duction in availability of operating credit may lead to farmer responses
such as reductions in operating inputs or changes in enterprises in
order to remain viable operations. They also report that capital credit
availability is strongly linked to business performance (at least in the
previous year), and that restricting capital credit rather than charging
higher loan interest rates is a favored means of financial control for
lenders.
It is fairly obvious that many factors can cause an operator or a
landlord to contribute less capital (either borrowed or equity) to the
farm enterprises than the amount that would equate its narginal cost
with marginal revenues. Whether the restriction results from a risk
response of the individual, an external credit limitation, a household-
firm conflict (e.g., buying a car vs. investing in a no till-planter),
or some combination of the above, in reality the above mentioned equa
tion is seldom attained. The focus of the analysis in this chapter will
be on how short-term and total capital constraints affect the selection
of crop-management systems by the farm operators and thus their effects
on soil erosion. Also, effects of short-term capital constraints on the
50-50 landlord's crop management selections will be modeled. Because
the 0-35 landlord contributes no operating capital, and since terracing
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did not enter solutions voluntarily in chapter three scenarios, total
capital is not constrained for either landlord.
It was shown in an earlier study that the landlord and tenant
under a crop-share lease can reach agreement on a farm plan in absence
of livestock production activities if each party has roughly the same
relative capital limitations (Heady, Dean, and Egbert, 1956). For pur
poses of this study the various types of capital were constrained with
in the LP models at arbitrary percentages of the capital levels uti
lized in the model solutions of scenario two. The focus of the analy
sis is more on effects of the capital constraints on economics of the
soil and water conservation practices rather than the lease party com
patibility.
The first scenario (scenario eight in Appendix A) assumes that the
operator or landlord maximizes 1985 before-tax net returns subject to a
constraint on the amount of short-term capital available to him (short-
term capital is requried for such inputs as seed, fuels, pesticides,
fertilizers, repairs, etc.). The operator or landlord may choose his
farm plan using any combination of rotations, tillage systems, and sup
porting practices. The following restrictions based on percentage of
short-term capital used in scenario two by the respective operator or
landlord are modeled and solved: (1) 90 and 80 percent of the short-
term capital used by the owner-operator in scenario two are available
to the owner-operator in scenarios 8A1 and 8A2, respectively; (2) 85
percent for the 50-50 tenant; (3) 85 percent (scenario 8D1) and
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The 50-50 tenant, whetr rationed on short-term capital, also puts his
less productive soils in COMMM and pasture rotations or takes thea out of
production entirely. However, the slot-plant tillage system is always
the most profitable system for this tenant on the meadow—intensive rota
tion. As pointed out in Chapter II, his sharing the pesticide costs with
the landlord often makes the slot-plant system his most profitable till
age system.
COMMM rotations are also most profitable for the 50-50 landlord when
his short-term capital is limited. However, he would generally prefer
that the tenant use conventional tillage rather than slot-planting be
cause the former requires less pesticides than any of the other tillage
systems on this crop rotation. Such discrepancy in the choice of tillage
systems between the 50-50 lease parties results from the landlord's dis-
association with fuel and other machine costs.
The 100-65 tenant reacts similarly to the owner-operator in his
rotation and tillage system selection when his short-term capital is
limited. The main difference is that pasture is often more profitable
for him than COMMM on many soils of C slope or greater when his short-
term capital is limited. Also production on many of the E slope soils
may be unprofitable for him.
In scenario nine, in which the operators are allowed to maximize
1985 net returns subject to total (non-real estate) capital constraints
and the availability of all crop-management systems, the owner-operator
and 100-65 tenant solutions are very much like those in scenario two.
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The 50-50 tenant, when rationed on short-term capital, also puts his
less productive soils in COMllM and pasture rotations or takes them out of
production entirely. However, the slot-plant tillage system is always
the most profitable system for this tenant on the meadow-intensive rota
tion. As pointed out in Chapter II, his sharing the pesticide costs with
the landlord often makes the slot-plant system his most profitable till
age system.
COMMM rotations are also most profitable for the 50-50 landlord when
his short-term capital is limited. However, he would generally prefer
that the tenant use conventional tillage rather than slot-planting be
cause the former requires less pesticides than any of the other tillage
systems on this crop rotation. Such discrepancy in the choice of tillage
systems between the 50-50 lease parties results from the landlord's dis-
association with fuel and other machine costs.
The 100-65 tenant reacts similarly to the owner-operator in his
rotation and tillage system selection when his short-term capital is
limited. The main difference is that pasture is often more profitable
for him than C0^®1M on many soils of C slope or greater when his short-
term capital is limited. Also production on many of the E slope soils
may be unprofitable for him.
In scenario nine, in which the operators are allowed to maximize
1985 net returns subject to total (non-real estate) capital constraints
and the availability of all crop-management systems, the owner-operator
and 100-65 tenant solutions are very much like those in scenario two.
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The only difference is that some land is taken out of production
because of the lack of capital. The corn-soybean till-plant system, on
the contour on slopes C and greater, remains the most profitable crop-
management system. Although the till-plant system requires slightly
more capital than the slot-plant system, net returns are enough higher
that it is still the most profitable system for the farm as a whole.
When total non-real estate capital is a constraint, corn-soybean
production and not producing on less productive soils are most profit
able for the 50-50 tenant. However, since he shares the pesticide
costs with his landlord and the slot-plant system requires less total
capital per acre than the till-plant system, the slot-plant system is
most profitable for his whole farm plan.
It is interesting to see what liappens to income and soil movement
(assuming land taken out of production has zero soil movement) when the
total capital is constrained for each operator based on the total capi
tal he used in scenario two. Looking at Table 7, we can see that for
the two most erosive farms (in Jasper and Ida counties), reducing total
capital available to the owner-operator by 10 percent and the tenants
by 15 percent reduces net returns by 5.3 and 6.6 or less, respectively.
This decrease in net returns is a direct result of taking very erosive
soils with very low returns out of production. Also, taking these
erosive soils out of row-crop production substantially reduces whole
farm soil movement levels, assuming zero soil movement on idle land.
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The net returns for the Boone county farm are reduced almost equiv-
alently to the percentage reduction in capital availability because all
these soils are very productive and provide high net returns per acre.
Similarly, on the Van Buren farm the owner-operator's net returns fall
only slightly when total capital is constrained because he has taken a
low net return SMU (65E2) out of production. The capital restriction
merely eliminates the need for the capital he was using to produce pas
ture under scenario two. The tenants used no capital on SMU 65E2 in
scenario two, so constraining their total capital by the selected method
used in scenario nine had a much greater effect on their net returns
than for the owner-operator. Generally the highly erosive soils have
very low net returns potential, yet do require substantial capital for
production. The significance of this will be expanded in the policy
implication chapter.
Effects of Capital Costs on Soil and Water
Conservation Practice Use
In general, the owner-operator and 100-65 tenant models are fairly
insensitive to capital costs (see Appendix B). The model solutions
indicate that at very high short-term interest rates and very low
medium-term interests rates, COMMM rotations would begin to enter the
solutions for scenario two. Since such an occurrence is unlikely
(interest rates generally move together), it appears that normal ranges
of interest rates will not affect soil erosion significantly. The 50-50
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tenant solutions are similar in that slightly higher short-term and
slightly lower medium term interest rates make the till-plant tillage
system for a given rotation more profitable than the slot-plant tillage
system, and vice versa.
Summary
Under situations in which short-term capital is constrained, these
models indicate that most farm plans would utilize more meadow-
intensive rotations such as COMMM under either chisel-plow or slot-
plant tillage and no supporting practices. The amount of COMMM that
could actually be expected to be raised by farmers is most likely over
estimated in these model results for three reasons: (1) the COMMM ro
tations require substantially greater amounts of ntedium-term capital
than corn-bean rotations, (2) these models do not allow for different
levels of fertilization on the various rotations, and (3) market
effects of the increased meadow production are not accounted for. In
actuality, farmers may be more inclined to reduce fertilization levels
on certain soils in the corn-soybean rotation than to adopt so much
meadow production. Also, meadow production implies that a livestock
production enterprise exists that will utilize this roughage feed, a
rather bold assumption.
Scenario nine perhaps gives a more realistic example of what oper
ators might do under internal or external capital constraints. The
operators generally take their least productive soils out of produc-
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tioa, and the most profitable cropping system is still the corn-soybean
rotation using till^planting on the contour on SMUs of slope C and
steeper. This last scenario gives an approximation of the effect capi
tal rationing has on farm size, which will be further discussed in the
following chapter.
In conclusion, capital constraints cause less intensive crop rota
tions and conservation tillage systems such as the till- and slot-plant
systems to be even more economically attractive than when capital is
unlimited. Although terracing is not econoniical under unlimited capi
tal, capital restrictions obviously make it even less attractive. Cap
ital costs do not appear to substantially affect soil and water conser
vation practices.
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CHAPTER V. EFFECTS OF FARM SIZE ON SOIL AND WATER
CONSERVATION PRACTICES
Farm numbers in the United States have been declining for over
the past four decades, accompanied a greater concentration of farttt~
ing in larger units. The reasons for this transformation are numerous.
Some of them are: (1) greater employment and income opportunities off
the farm; (2) tax rules encouraging firm growth; (3) government price
support and supply restriction policies favoring larger producers; (4)
price incentives for farmers to substitute capital goods for labor and
the concurring enterprise specialization; (5) the encouragement of firm
growth caused by inflation and expectations of further inflation in the
1970s; (6) the accumulation of wealth during this period enabling
individuals to expand into larger farm units; (7) farm credit policies;
(8) developments in machinery technology, and (9) cost efficiencies
associated with farm size. Although there is no guarantee that such
factors encouraging larger farms will continue into the future, and
although the annual decrease in number of farms has declined from 3.5
percent in the early 60s to 0.7 percent in the late 70s (Schertz and
Wunderlich, 1982), many people believe the past trend will continue.
One recent study estimates that the total number of farms in the year
2000 is expected to be 1.75 million, down from the 2.5 million farms
existing in 1980 (Lin, Coffman, and Penn, 1980).
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Many issues have been raised concerning the consequences to soci
ety of declining farm numbers and the simultaneous growth in average
farm size. Past research has shown that larger and fewer farms can be
expected to stagnate or depress rural economies, raise individual farm
Incomes, lower total farm income, and benefit consumers through lower
commodity prices (Sonka and Heady, 1974). Other issues such as equal
distribution of farm wealth and political objectives of agriculture and
the rural community may hinge on the farm size/number situation.
Although the issue has existed for some years, the effects farm
size have on use of soil and water conservation practices has recently
regained public interest. Held and Timmons (1958) in a study of
erosion on Western Iowa farms, found that larger farms had lower levels
of soil movement than smaller farms. In the most recent study of this
series, Hauser (1976) reaffirmed this relationship.
More recently, using data from the land ownership survey (Lewis,
1980) mentioned earlier, Lee (1980) and Otte (1982) both found that
high farm income was related to low soil loss. Baron (1981), using the
same data, found a positive relation between conservation investment
and both size of land holding and farm income.
Such results by no means assure that with large size farms must
come more conservation practices and less soil erosion. It is the
intent in this chapter to merely point out some economic reasons why
and why not larger farms may be expected to be less erosive than
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smaller farms. Today it Is becoming more and more difficult to define
a farm. Are the several 160-acre tracts that a doctor owns and leases
out at various locations outside the city a farm? How should the 500
acres the farmer rents, in addition to the 1000 acres he owns, be clas
sified? This study refers to a farm unit as all land farmed under one
management with a specific machinery and equipment complement. This
analysis begins by discussing economic theory relating to determination
of the "optimal" size of firm.
Theory of Farm Size, Efficiency
One of the most important determinants of farm size in a static
context (i.e. prices and technologies are given) is the shape of the
long run average cost curve, or envelope curve, and the position of
the minimum long run average cost on that curve.
The long run is defined as a time period in which no factors of
production are fixed; the short-run is a period in which at least one
factor is fixed. The long run average cost curve is simply the curve
tangent to the family of short-run average cost curves representing
minimum average costs per unit of output for various "plant sizes"
representing different amounts of the fixed resource(s), given a set of
prices and technologies. A typical U-shaped short run average cost
curve (SAC) is illustrated in Figure 1. The downward sloping part
represents fuller utilizaton of the fixed plant, or resource, and
spreading of the fixed costs over more and more output. The rising
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portion of the curve results from having to apply larger and larger
proportions of variable inputs to the fixed resource to gain additional
units of output (this assumes diminishing marginal productivity).
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Figure 3. Theoretical illustration of short-run average cost
curves and envelope curve
Given the long-run average cost curve illustrated in Figure 1, it
would appear that a short-run plant (or farm) of the size represented by
SAC4 is capable of achieving the lowest average costs per unit of out
put (i.e., is the most cost efficient size), since it is tangent to the
lowest point on the long-run average cost curve.
Of course in reality cost efficiency is not the only factor influ
encing farm size. Many things in fact tend to restrict the size that
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many growing farm units actually achieve. The above theoretical case
supposes a competitive environment and many other assumptions (perfect
knowledge, mobility and homogeneity of resources, ease of entry into the
industry, etc.)- In reality, knowledge is not perfect—farmers are un
certain of prices, labor availability, weather conditions, economic con
ditions in general, capital availability, and many other things* In
addition, the indivisibility of some resources, such as a large tractor
or a tract of land, or unavailability of land in local real estate mar
kets, may prevent a farmer's reaching the most cost efficient size. Al
so, even though larger scale may mean more technical and pecuniary econ
omies than those realized in the average size farms, managerial ability
may impose limitations on the size a farm may attain.
Literature Review Relating to Farm Size Theory
Much research has been done in attempts to determine the relation
ship between farm size and cost efficiency for many types of farms, and
also the role this possible efficiency may play in promoting farm
growth. Several studies on this topic are Seckler and Young (1978),
Bailey (1973), Stanton (1978), Hall and LeVeen (1978), Miller, Rodewald
and McElroy (1981), Chan, Heady, and Sonka (1976), Heady and Krenz
(1962), Ihnen and Heady (1964), and Madden and Partenheimer (1972). The
general concensus of the authors of these studies is that the long-run
average cost curve for midwest grain farms, whether it includes land and
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labor charges or not, tends to be L-shaped, i.e., production costs de
cline rapidly with initial increase in size and then level off or de
cline at a very low rate. Little evidence is found of increasing costs
as farm sizes get very large. Stanton (1978) stated that "It has been
easier to identify what makes this cost curve fall than to discover
evidence or demonstrate economic logic that shovre long-run costs rising
after some point" (pg. 730). Heady and Krenz (1962) incorporated costs
associated with reduced yields resulting from untimeliness of opera
tions in a farm size-efficiency study analyzing different sets of
machine complements in Iowa. They found that the envelope curve devel
oped for their assumed technology and production functions exhibited
rapidly increasing per-unit costs at farm sizes above 800 crop acres.
Of course, there have been phenomenal increases in machine size and
technology since that study. Seckler and Young sum up the farm size-
efficiency topic as follows: "Increasing average farm size does not
necessarily imply the presence of economies of size^ it only implies
the absense of significant diseconomies of size" (p. 581).
The general conclusion presented in several of the above studies
is that most all of the efficiencies associated with farm size can be
attained in a fully mechanized one-man farm in which the maximum
acreage of crops, subject to the capability of the man and his machin
ery complement, is produced. Bailey (1973) states that "the techni
cally optimum one-man farm is larger, requires more capital, and
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demands a higher level of managerial talent than is found on most one-
man farms today in the United States" (p. v).
Any slight additional cost efficiencies that are realized on farms
of larger size appear to result from better management, large farms
having access to higher-quality resources, and slightly (If any)
greater market access and availability of premium prices (Hall and
LeVeen, 1978).
The main reasons associated with farms Increasing in size above
this range in which most economies can be realized are the desires to
increase income, enlarge the bundle of resources that the operator or
family controls, and gain increased prestige in the community. The
main factors restricting the frequency of growth to very large farm
sizes are: limitations in managerial and coordinating abilities; un
certainties associated with commodity and resource prices, weather,
crop disasters, and labor supply; limited availability of capital or
internal capital rationing because of risks; and unavailability of land
in local areas.
Discussion
The main point that can be extracted from the above studies and
applied to how farm size may affect use of soil and water conservation
practices is that about costs per unit of output. There is no evidence
that there are significant cost differences between "average" farm
sizes such as are modeled in this stu<fy and those of much larger farms.
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Even smaller farms do not have to incur much higher costs per unit of
output if they can hire the cropping activities done on a custom basis
(Hall and LeVeen, 1978).
Further analysis of per acre crop production costs can provide
additional support to the argument in progress. In crop farming, most
of the variable costs such as seed, fertilizer, and pesticides are the
same per acre and per unit of output regardless of farm size. The costs
that do vary according to farm size are the "fixed" costs of the machine
and equipment set that is used on the farm. The above discussion,
which demonstrates the relatively flat long-run average cost curve,
suggests that it is possible to fit machine sets to varying farm sizes
to approximate relatively equal per acre or per unit of output machine
costs on farms of varying sizes, save for the very smallest farms. In
the context of our study, if in fact larger farms do realize lower
average levels of soil movement, it could be the result of more superior
or conscientious management that has adopted the nore economical till
and slot-plant systems for their farm operations. In addition to having
higher returns Co land, labor, and management, these two tillage systems
always require less labor than the conventional fall mold-board plow,
chisel-plow, and spring-disk tillage systems on the various rotations.
Also, these systems require much less time in the critical spring plant
ing period on the corn-soybean rotation, as no pre-plant field prepara
tion is required.
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As for the adoption of terracing or other structures that appear
to be non-profitable in a short-run context, there is also no reason a
priori that a large farmer should implement such soil and water conser
vation practices any more frequently than a smaller farmer.
As mentioned in Che previous chapter, a larger asset base niay give
a larger farmer access to more funds. In addition, investments in soil
and water conservation practices such as terracing may be slightly more
attractive to a person in a higher tax bracket. However, large farm
size (measured in either acres or net farm income) is not a reliable
indicator of a farmer's financial situation. For example, large farmers
can be in low equity, tight cash flow situations, and small farmers may
have an off-farm job or somehow have acquired wealth. One exception
must be made to the above statement. Theoretically, as the acreage of
the farm increases, any costs and benefits of externalities associated
with soil loss and delivery to streams from the farms are increasingly
internalized to the farm firm. This internalizaton becomes more
important as the farm expands contiguously. Since land markets infre
quently allow such expansion, this factor associated with farm size
probably has a limited influence on adoption of soil and water conser
vation practices in reality.
Other factors may actually Inhibit the adoption of soil and water
conservation practices on large farms. It is conceivable that the use
of tillage equipment 60 feet in width may be incompatible with such
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practices as contouring and terracing. It is important to note that
terracing is fairly effective in reducing soil movement, yet as our
models indicate, is quite unprofitable or has high opportunity costs
in a short-run analysis. Contouring, although an assumed activity in
our models for the till- and slot-plant tillage systems oti SMUs of
slope C or steeper, is only slightly or moderately effective in curb
ing soil movement on most SMUs of C or steeper slope as caeasured by
the Universal Soil Loss Equation. Therefore, the possible machine-
supporting practice incompatiblity would not result in erosion levels
significantly greater on larger farms than for the looderatly sized
farms modeled in this study.
Conclusions
It appears that if larger farms actually are less erosive than
small and average sized farms in general, the main causal factor is
management. More skillful management may realize and take advantage
of the cost economies offered by the reduced tillage systems. Operat
ing most cost efficiently may also give a farmer with high management
skills an advantage in acquiring less erosive, more productive lands.
Finally, a larger asset base may give a farmer access to more funds
than the average farcier, which could enable him to invest more heavily
in soil and water conserving structures.
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CHAPTER VI. STUDY LIMITATIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There are several limitations of this study that must be under
stood to adequately interpret the results and in giving consideration
to policy implications. Many deal with lack, of sufficient data—others
deal with the many assumptions that were made in the model construc
tion.
It was assumed that farra owners and/or operators are solely maxi-
mizers of single-period net returns. Many landowners and farmers have
much longer planning horizons and may satisfy other choice criteria
such as net worth (wealth), cash flows, after tax net income, or house
hold utility. For a discussion of economics of soil and water conser
vation practices under longer planning horizons, see Bhide, Pope, and
Heady (1982).
The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) was used as a measurement
device for average annual soil loss. This equation approximates soil
movement or displacement caused by rainfall, and in many cases over
estimates soil loss from the field or farm boundaries. Soil erosion
caused by wind is not accounted for in the models.
Only terracing, strip cropping, and contouring are included in the
models. Other supporting practices such as catch basins, ridge plant
ing or listing, and catch crops bordering streams may be effective ways
to reduce soil erosion and/or sediment delivery. Also, there are many
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other variations in tillage methods and crop rotations used in Iowa.
Only the more popular tillage systems and crop rotations representing
different erosiveness levels were modeled.
Sufficient data are not available to accurately predict long-term
effects of soil loss on productivity. These single-period models
therefore attribute no reductions to productivity from soil erosion,
which may bias slightly the profitability of terracing. More research
is necessary in ascertaining the effects of soil losses on the future
productivity potentials for many soil types.
In these models, is it assumed that all coefficients (resource
constraints, prices, technical production, soil loss, etc.) are known
with certainty. In reality most of these coefficients are variable, so
an attempt is made to use the average values or best estimates for
these coefficients based on historical data. The model solutions for
scenario two appear to be moderately sensitive to input and output
prices. However, much of the sensitivity is between the till- and
slot-plant tillage systems rather than crop rotations (see the sensi
tivity section of Chapter III). Large variations in relative prices
could undoubtedly alter the uses of soil and water conservation prac
tices from those of the model solutions of scenario two.
Also, since conclusive evidence to the contrary does not exist, it
is assumed that yields do not differ across tillage systems and sup
porting practices. If yield differences between tillage systems do
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exist on certain soils for some technical reason or lack of managerial
ability, the solution results might also change (see Pope, Bhide, and
Heady, 1982c).
This analysis ignores the effects of livestock on the economics of
soil and water conservation practices# The landowners and/or operators
are given markets for alfalfa, oats, straw, and pasture. Silage is
not sold as it is seldom grown as a cash crop in Iowa. If a tenant or
an owner-operator who rents additional land has a livestock enterprise
in addition to his cash crop enterprise, his use of soil and water con
servation practices may differ according to the type of livestock
raised and the most profitable ration fed to the livestock. For exam
ple, if an owner-operator who rents additional land feeds steers using
a silage ration, he may be inclined to raise the erosive silage rota
tions on the landlord's farm if so allowed. For a discussion of the
effects of livestock and dairy enterprises on the economics of soil and
water conservation practices, see Krog, Bhide, Pope, and Heady (1982).
Under soil loss restrictions and short-run capital limitations the
owner-operators and tenant-operators may produce much more meadow and
pasture. Since the modeled market prices reflect current market con
ditions, large quantities of alfalfa and pasture production would
surely not support these price levels, i.e. there are not enough rough
age consuming animals in local markets to utilize such high produc
tion.
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In linear programming models, production activities represent one
mix of inputs and outputs in fixed proportions. Because of the large
data requirements, only one resource mix considered to be technically
"optimal" was included in the models for the activity consisting of a
rotation, tillage system, and supporting practice. Under certain leas
ing arrangements or when resources such as capital are a constraint,
different resource mixes (e.g., using less fertilizer on a corn-soybean
rotation) may be more profitable overall for the operator or the owner
than the "optimal" cropping system that is modeled.
Also, these models Include annual machinery ownership and variable
costs for the machine complements based on time required for field
operations* Costs involved in switching from one tillage system to
another are not accounted for. For example, although most modern row-
crop planters can economically be adapted to till- or slot-planting,
the farmer may find that the opportunity costs (or reservation prices)
of his moldboard and chisel plows are very low, possibly salvage value.
Other costs such as managerial training may be involved in adopting the
new tillage systems. Of course, potential benefits such as more
leisure time are also not accounted for.
Policy Implications
It is evident that in many areas of Iowa soil erosion is occurring
at very high levels. Although data are not yet present to accurately
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estimate the relationship between soil erosion and soil productivity,
enough evidence exists today to assure that at some point soil loss re
duces potential soil productivity. For the time being, soil scientists
have assumed that T-values represent a "safe" soil loss level. The
major objective of soil and water conservation policies is to encourage
and help farmers to approach these soil loss goals in a manner least
costly to farmers and society. Policy alternatives include education
and technical assistance, cost-sharing and subsidies, disincentives
such as taxes or fines on soil erosion, and direct regulation of the
cultural pratices that farmers may use. Policy formulation must also
account for effects that tenure arrangements, capital restrictions, and
farm size may have in influencing the attractiveness to farmers of
various soil and water conservation practices.
Results of this study indicate that use of reduced tillage systems
such as the till- and slot-plant systems can actually increase net re
turns to operators and substantially reduce soil erosion levels from
corresponding levels under conventional tillage systems. Farmers
should be encouraged to adopt such practices through the extension of
inforioation concerning the cost and time-saving advantages of these
systems, and also through the provision of technical assistance. Also
more intensive yield research is necessary to assure that reduced til
lage systems will not lead to reduced yields on erosive-prone Iowa
soils. There is no indication that such policy need differ with
respect to tenure of operator or his capital availability, or farm
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size. The cost economies of the till- and slot-plant tillage systems
are at least as attractive to tenants as to owner-operators. Also,
these tillage systems require less capital than conventional systems
utilizing moldboard and chisel plows, field cultivators, disks, and
other tillage equipment.
On many Iowa soils, supporting practices such as terracing and
strip-cropping, and meadow-intensive rotations are required in addition
to reduced tillage systems to reduce soil erosion levels to T-values.
This study indicates that an owner-operator with unlimited capital
would have to be subsidized at levels greater than 50 percent to find
terracing profitable on many of the SMUs analyzed if regulated to
T-levels. If cost-sharing on structural investments between leasing
parties is successfully promoted, there will be no need to subsidize
the tenant and landlord to any greater degree. Also, guarantees for
unexhausted investments and/or longer leases should be encouraged to
make longer term investments such as terracing and meadow rotations
more attractive to lease parties.
Given markets for meadow and pasture, crop-share tenants appear to
adopt less erosive rotations more readily on the highly erosive soils.
Policies and programs which aid marketing of hay and pasture should be
given consideration by policymakers. However, it is very likely that
policies supporting extensive hay and pasture production could prove to
be costly to farmers and/or society. The large acreages of these crops
that are necessary to bring soil losses in Iowa to T-values would
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surely depress market prices, burdening farmers if unsubsidized or
society if subsidies are granted to farmers for production of these
crops.
Terracing, even when used in conjunction with reduced tillage
practices, does not reduce the slope and slope length of many soils
enough to constrain soil losses to T-values when corn and soybeans are
grown in rotation on them. Research should be devoted to developing
more economically and technically effective soil erosion reducing prac
tices that create and/or maintain structures on a continuous basis via
field operations. Practices such as till- and slot-planting and culti
vating on ridges and the contour could prove very useful in reducing
soil losses in row crop production.
Based on past research findings, it appears that policies to re
strict farm size cannot be justified on soil erosion issues.
Solutions from the capital constraint analysis emphasize the fact
that many of the most erosive soils analyzed produce low net returns.
On many of these soils net returns from meadow rotations are close to
or higher than returns from corn-soybean rotations. It makes little
sense to invest public funds on terracing soils for which expected re
turns will not cover the structure costs. These soils could be
targeted for set-aside lands or wildlife areas if meadow and pasture
rotations cannot contain soil erosion on them.
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CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The current levels of soil erosion in Iowa are contaminating
strean^ and lakes, harming wildlife, and reducing future soil produc
tivity potentials. Past studies have attempted to associate such vari
ables as tenure, capital availability, and farm size to soil erosion
levels using cross sectional data from farmer and landowner surveys.
This study analyzes how the above variables may be expected to affect
the economics of soil and water conservation practices utilized by Iowa
farmers that greatly determine soil erosion levels.
The framework of the analysis consists of linear-programming
models representing four cash crop farms in Iowa that vary in erosive-
ness class, land resource area, watershed, and principal soil associa
tion. These models incorporate various crop management systems consis
ting of five tillage systems, three supporting practices, and eight
crop rotations, representing popular soil and water conservation prac
tices used in Iowa and a wide range of erosiveness levels. The five
modeled tillage systems include conventional fall moldboard plow,
chisel plow, spring disk, till-plant, and slot-plant. The three sup
porting practices include terracing, strip cropping, and contouring.
Also, grass waterways are assumed to be used where necessary. Crop
rotations including several combinations of corn-grain, soybeans, oats,
meadow, and pasture are modeled. Crop yields are assumed to be equal
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across tillage systems and supporting practices, and they are not re
duced to reflect decreased productivity resulting from soil erosion.
Soil losses are approximated for each crop management system using the
Universal Soil Loss Equation.
These models are solved to maximize 1985 before tax net returns to
an owner-operator, and to the landlords and tenants of two crop share
leases used in Iowa. Solutions are obtained for scenarios representing
various assumptions about farmers* willingness and ability to use cer
tain soil and water conservation practices, capital constraints, soil
loss restrictions, and soil loss taxes.
Conclusions
In all modeled scenarios, the owner operator and both leasing par
ties generally raise as much corn and soybeans in rotation on most SMUs
as constraints will allow. However, on some very erosive soils on
which meadow and pasture rotations are more productive, these forages
may provide higher net returns than the corn-soybean rotation. This is
true even more so for crop-share tenants. The more variable costs the
tenant must assume, the more aiarginal land he will put into meadow and
pasture rotations or take out of production, and the more incompatible
he will become with his landlord in farm planning. As a result, the
crop-share tenants appear to be less erosive cash crop farmers than
owner-operators when only short-run profits are considered.
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Given the willingness and ability to use all soil and water con
servation practices, reduced tillage systems such as the till- and
slot-plant systems are more profitable than conventional tillage sys
tems for all farm operators. Corn and soybean rotations raised with
these tillage systems on the contour on slopes C and steeper are most
profitable on most Iowa soils. These tillage systems allow greater net
returns and lower soil erosion levels for most rotations than do con
ventional tillage systems.
When soil loss taxes or restrictions are imposed upon farmers,
more lands are put into meadow and pasture rotations or taken out of
production entirely rather than terraced to allow production. Such
restrictions and penalties also lower net returns. The results of this
analysis indicate that many landowners will have to be subsidized at
levels greater than 50 percent to find terracing a profitable enter
prise when restrained to T-values (soil loss levels that allow main
tenance of soil productivity). Also, tenants m^ find it economically
beneficial to share terracing costs on more productive, erosive soils
if constrained to T-values.
This analysis indicates that low capital availability can result
in lower levels of soil erosion, either by making meadow Intensive
rotations more economical or by forcing unproductive, erosive soils out
of production. At^ capital provided to farmers for erosion control
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purposes should be targeted at encouraging adoption of reduced tillage
systeiDS or terracing on soils that warrant such costs.
Survey studies have associated lower soil erosion levels with
larger farms. If this is a true relationship, it is most likely caused
by better management of crop systems. To a lesser degree, greater cap
ital availability and possibly higher tax brackets may make structural
investments more possible or attractive for larger farmers. Also,
larger farmers control less erosive soils than smaller farmers.
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APPENDIX A: TENURE MODEL SOLUTIONS FOR VARIOUS SCENARIOS
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APPENDIX B: RANGE ANALYSES FOR SELECTED ACTIVITIES
FOR TENURE MODELS UNDER SCENARIO TWO
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Table B.l. Range analysis for selected activities
operator, scenario two
OT the Boone County farm for owner-
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity Ifivel Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, till-plant, none, 107A1 14A -65.51 -68.50 9
CB, slot-plant, none, 107A1 0 -64.16 _ OP -61.17
CB, conventional, none, 107A1 0 -70.68 _ OT -57.01
CB, chisel-plow, none, 107A1 0 -68.10 « OP -60.58
C, till-plant, none, 107A1 0 -78.87 -24.40
CB, till-plant, none, 35A1 80 -66.33 -66.70
CB, till-plant, none, 13SB1 74 -65.51 -65.93 -65.17
CB, till-plant, none, 138C2 22 -64.76 -65.07 -57.17
CB, conventional, terrace, 138C2 0 -69.94 — 09 -36.03
CB, chisel-plow, terrace, 13802 0 -67.36 — 9 -39.81
Buy herbicides 5,90A -1.00 -1.34 -0.60
Biy dlesel 2,025 -1.30 -3.04 0.09
Buy LP gas 3,948 -0.69 -4.42 O.OS
Borrow short-term capital 38,330 -0.075 -0.21 0.0
Borrow aedlua tera capital 26,894 -0.15 -0.31 -0.04
Biy nitrogen 24,731 -0.14 -0.53 0.01
Buy phosphorus 15,111 -0.27 -1.47 0.02
Biy potash 16,824 -0.12 -0.85 0.01
Sell corn 23,681 2.56 1.93 3.34
Sell soybeans 7,788 7.30 6.17 9.05
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 — 65.71
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 2.64
Sell pasture 0 8.00 ^ CO 29.99
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Table B.2. Range aoalysls for selected activities on the Van Buren County faro for ovner-
operator, scenario two
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity Level Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
P, conventioaal, none, 6SE2 144 -7.76 -8.06 09
till-plant, none, 131B1 108 -64.23 -67.64 00
CB, slot-plant, none, 131B1 0 -62.89 . W -59.48
CB, conventional, none, 13161 0 -69.41 ^ 00 -56.21
CB, chisel-plow, none, 131B1 0 -66.83 __ g» -59.53
CB, till-plant, contour, 132C2 108 -62.74 -65.71 -61.60
CB, slot-'plant, contour, 132C2 0 -61.39 -58.42
BtQT herbicides 3,985 -1.00
0
1
-0.65
Bvy diesel 1,316 -1.30 -5.00 -0.91
BtQT IP gas 2,226 -0.69 -0.87 -0.05
Borrow short-term capital 25,355 -0.075 -0.11 0.00
Borrow medium term capital 27,691 -0.150 -0.154 -0.10
Bu/ nitrogen 13,354 -0.14 -0.21 -O.Ol
Buy phosphorus 8,997 -0.27 -0.36 -0.20
Bu/ potash 9,959 -0.12 -0.21 -0.11
Sell corn 13,354 2.56 2.52 2.98
Sell soybeans 4,386 7.30 7.21 8.57
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 _ GA 58.12
Sell oats 0 1.56 _ OR 3.77
Sell pasture 373 8.00 7.88 25.52
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Table B.3. Range analysis for selected activities on the Jasper County farm for owoer-
operator, scenario two
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity level Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, till-plant, contour, 120C2 204 -66.61 -69.58
CB, till-plant, contour, 162D2 68 -65.21 -68.18 09
C3, slot-plant, contour, 16202 0 -63.87 ^ OQ -60.90
CB, conventional, terrace, 162D2 0 -70.39 -56.51
CB, till-plant, none, 119A1 34 -68.05 -71.09
CB, till-*plant, contour, 24E2 34 -61.76 -61.76 -53.41
P, conventional, none, 24E2 0 -8.49 OD 63.91
Bu/ herbicides 6,273 -1.00 -1.38 -0.46
Bvy diesel 2,224 -1.30 -8.48 0.10
LP gas 4,149 -0.69 -2.78 0.05
Borrow short-term capital 40,619 -0.075 -0.45 0.00
Borrow medlua term capital 28,498 -0.15 -0.58 -0.05
Bu/ nitrogen 24,868 -0.14 -0.36 0.01
Buy phosphorus 15,830 -0.27 -2.10 0.02
Biy potash 17,592 -0.12 -1.77 0.00
Sell corn 24,888 2.56 2.21 3.37
Sell soybeans 8,122 7.30 6.66 116.66
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 * m 62.18
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 2.36
Sell pasture 0 8.00 0 19.01
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Table B.4, Range analysis for selected activities on the Ida County farm for owner-
operator, scenario two
Range of coats where activity
Selected Activities Activity L£vel Input Cost Upper Cose Lower Cost
Cfi, till-plant, contour, 1D3 47 -61.14 -64.06 G9
COMMH, slot-plant, contour, 1D3 0 -43.05 . oa -36.96
P, conventional, none* 1D3 0 -3.95 . m 29.90
CB, till-plant contour, 1E3 93 -59.79 -59.90 -55.05
COMMM, slot-plant, contour, 1E3 0 -42.36 -42.42 -42.32
P, conventional, none, 1E3 0 -1.94 -20.97 20.04
CB, spring-disk, none, 10C2 56 -64.58 -64.59 CO
CB, till-plant, contour, 10C2 0 -63.24 » 90 63.23
CB, spring-'tiisk., none, 10D2 52 -63.16 -63.16
CB. till-plant, contour, 10D2 0 -61.81 ^ 9 61. BI
CB, slot-plant, contour, 10D2 0 -60.47 CO -60.43
CB, till-plant, countour 12C1 62 -64.16 -67.07 m
CB, spring-disk, none, 12C1 0 -65.53 _ flg -62.59
Biy herbicides 5,719 -1.00 -1.29 -1.00
Biy diesel 1,892 -1.30 -1.32 -0.61
Buy LF gas 2,60U -0.69 -3.99 0.05
Borrow short-term capital 32,180 -0.075 -0.51 -0.07
Borrow oedivin term capital 25,299 -0.15 -0.15 -0.07
nitrogen 15,596 -0.14 -0.26 0.01
Biy phosphorus 9,948 -0.27 -2.70 0.02
Buy potash 11,072 -0.12 -2.04 0.01
Sell com 15,596 2.56 2.01 3.39
Sell soybeans 5,124 7.30 6.28 18.63
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 — OD 65.48
Sell osts 0 1.56 -0.75 2.84
Sell pasture 0 8.00 — <D 21.53
1Table B.S> R^nge analysis for selected activities on the Boone County farm for SO-50
tenant, scenario two
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity I«vel Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, tlll-plant, none, 107A1 144 -65.51 -65.54 a>
CB, slot-plant, none, 107A1 0 -64,16 _» -64.13
COMMM, slot-plant, none, 107A1 0 -45.29 •- m -28.94
CB, till-plant, none, 55A1 80 -66.33 -66.37 CO
CB, slot-plant, none, 55A1 0 -64.99 _ m -64.95
CB, till-plant, none, 138B1 74 -65.51 -65,54 0»
CB, spring-disk, contour, 138B1 0 -66.85 w ee -62.90
CB, conventional, contour, 138B1 0 -70.68 -56.38
CB, slot-plant, contour, 138C2 22 -63.42 -63.43
CB, till-plant, contour, 138C2 0 -64.76 . 00 -64.75
Bu/ herbicides 6,025 -1.00 -1.002 -0.987
B19 diesel 2,017 -1.30 -1.40 -1.28
Btv LP gas 3.948 -0.686 -4.10 0.05
short-term capital 24,278 -0.075 -0.080 -0.055
Bi^ oediun~term capital 26,742 -0.15 -0.155 -0.149
Buy nitrogen 24,731 -0.14 -0.50 0.01
Bi^ phosphorus 15,111 -0.27 -1.77 0.02
Bty potash 16,824 -0.12 -1.46 -0.009
Sell corn grain 23,681 2.56 1.99 3.62
Sell soybeans 7,788 7.30 6.26 113.72
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 0 65.03
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 2.83
Sell pasture 0 8.00 _ (B 16.83
1^1
Table B.6. Range analysis for selected activities on the Van Buren County farm for 50-50
tenant, scenario two
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity Level Input Cose Upper Cost Lower Cost
P, conventional, none, 65E2 0 -7.76 -7.31
CB, till'-plaat, none, 131B1 108 -64.23 -64.31 9
CB, 8lot*-plant, none, 13181 0 -62.89 — tt -62.81
CB, clll'-plant, contour, 132C2 108 -62,74 -62.75 CB
CB, slot-plant, contour, 132C2 0 -61.39 -« -61.38
Bi^ herbicides 3,985 -1.00 -2.62 -0.99
Bt^ dlesel 1,306 -1.30 -1.34 0.10
Bt^ LP gas 2,226 -0.686 -3.86 0.05
Bty short-tern capital 15,347 -0.075 -0.274 -0.067
Buy medluai-tera capital 17,602 -0.15 -0.152 -0.144
819 nitrogen 13,354 -0.14 -0.51 0.01
Buy phosphorus 8,517 -0.27 -1.10 -0.003
Biy potash 9,479 -0.12 -0.86 0.009
Sell corn grain 13,354 2.56 2.03 3.40
Sell soybeans 4,386 7.30 6.24 11.26
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 « to 65.28
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 3.29
Sell pasture 0 8.00 0 8.34
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Table B.7. Range analysis for selected activities on the Jasper County farm for SO-SO
tenant, scenario two
Selected Activities Activity Level Input Cost
Range of costs where activity
level remains unchanged
Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, slot-plant, contour, 120C2 0 -65.26 -65.25
CB, till-plant, contour, 120C2 204 -66.61 -66.62
CB, clll-piant, contour, 162D2 68 -65.21 -65.22 QD
CB, slot-plant, contour, 162D2 0 -63.87 — -63.86
CB, till-plant, none, 119A1 34 -68.05 -68.13 V
CB, slot-plant, none, 119A1 0 -66.71 -66.63
CB, slot-plant, contour, 24E2 34 -60.42 -60.43 09
CB, tlll-plant, contour, 24E2 0 -61.76 ~CP -61.75
Biqr herbicides 6,460 -1.00 -1.03 -0.996
Buy dlesel 2,210 -1.30 -1.328 -1.279
Buy LF gas 4,149 -0.686 -1.762 0.05
Borrow short-term capital 25,807 -0.075 -o.oao -0.069
Borrow medlum-tera capital 28,264 -0.15 -0.152 -0.149
Buy nitrogen 24,888 -0.14 -0.25 0.01
Bty phosphorus 15,830 -0.27 -1.08 0.02
Bt^ potash 17,592 -0.12 -0.83 -0.06
Sell com grain 24,888 2.56 2.38 3.54
Sell soybeans 8,122 7.30 6.97 143.02
Sell slfalfa hay 0 57.73 60.02
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 1.97
Sell pasture 0 8.0 0 12.26
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Table B.8. Range analysis for selected activities on the Ida County farm for 50-50
tenant, scenario two
Selected Activities
Range of costs where activity
level remains unchanged
Activity Level Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, till-plant, contour, 1D3 47 -61.14 -61.20 «o
CB, slot-n>lant, contour, 1D3 0 -59.80 -• OB -59.74
P, conventional, none, 1D3 0 -3.95 16.90
P, conventional. None, 1E3 93 -1.94 -3.11 9
CB, till-plant, contour, 1E3 0 -59.79 ~ CO -55.58
CB, slot-plant, contour, 10C2 56 -61.89 -63.34
P, conventional, none, 10C2 0 -4.67 __ to 39.47
CB, slot-plant, contour, 10D2 52 -60.47 -61.92 OD
COHHH, slot-plant, contour, 10D2 0 -43.39 « m -41.79
CB, till-plant, contour, 12C1 62 -64.16 -64.21
COHMM, slot-plant, contour, 12C1 0 -44.58 — W -37.35
Buy herbicides 4,598 -1.00 -1.75 -0.98
Buy diesel 1,263 -1.30 -1.45 -1.12
Bi^ LP gas 2,039 -0.686 -3.92 -0.30
Bu/ short-cem capital 15,194 -0.075 -0.39 -0.06
Buy Dedius-tero capital 23,294 -0.15 -0.16 -0.05
Biy nitrogen 16,883 -0.14 -0.31 0.1
Buy phosphorus 8,432 -0.27 -1.67 -0.13
Biy potash 8,701 -0.12 -1.38 -0.03
Sell corn grain 12,233 2.56 2.02 2.62
Sell soybeans 4,030 7.30 6.32 7.49
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 — C» 65.36
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 2.67
Sell pasture 337 8.00 7.36 17.37
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Table B.9. Range analysis for selected activities on the Boooe County faro for SO-50
landlord, scenario tvo
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity Level Input Cost Upper Cost Lover Cost
CB, till-plant, none, 107A1 144 -31.15 -31.15
CB, slot--plant, none, 107A1 0 -31.15 — OD -28.19
CBC0»1, till-plant, none, 107A1 0 -27.68 — 00 -25.12
CB, till-plant, none, S5A1 eo -31.81 -31.81 m
COMMM, conventional, none, 3SA1 0 -23.34 « 09 -23.28
CBCOMM, till-plant, none, 55A1 0 -28.12 — C6 -27.96
CB, tlll-^lant, none, 138B1 74 -31.15 -31.15 «»
CB, till-plant, contour, 138C2 22 -30.55 -30.55 CB
CB, tlll*7lant, terrace, 136C2 0 -30.55 CO 61.46
COMMM, conventional, none, 138C2; 0 -22.84 — fl0 -22.57
P, conventional, none, 138C2 0 -16.09 -87.40
Biy herbicides 5,904 -1.00 -1.26 -0.88
Buy LP gas 3,948 -0.686 -1.95 0.05
Buy short-tera capital 14,090 -0.075 -0.315 0.024
nitrogen 24,731 -0.14 -0.57 0.01
Buy phosphorus 15,111 -0.27 -2.11 0.02
Bi^ potash 16,824 -0.12 -0.95 -0.04
Sell corn grain 23,681 2.56 2.35 3.00
Sell soybeans 7,788 7.30 6.69 7.84
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 • OR 60.40
Sell oats 0 1.56 <0 2.60
Sell pasture 0 8.00 0 36.12
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Table B.IO. Range analysis for selected activities on the Van Buren County fara for 50-%
landlord* scenario two
Selected Activities Activity l>vel Input Cost
Range of costs where activity
level remaias unchanged
Upper Cost Lower Cost
COMHM, conventional, none, 65E2 144 -19.59 -19.59 CO
P, conventional, none, 65E2 0 -16.56 — 4.46
CB, till-plant, none, 131B1 108 -30.06 -30.06 IB
COMHM, conventional, none, 131B1 0 -22.64 " CO -20.57
CBCOMM, conventional, none, 131B1 0 -26.94 • m -26.31
CB, till-plant, terrace, 131B1 0 -30,06 '«D 4.44
CB, till-plant, contour, 132C2 108 -28.86 -28.86
CB, till-plant, terrace, 13202 0 -28.86 — 40 28.65
Biy herbicide 4,517 -1.00 -1.25 -0.26
Buy insecticide 293 -1.00 -4.88 0.075
Buy LP gas 2,226 -0.686 -1.19 0.05
Bt^ nitrogen 13,354 -0.14 -0.33 0.01
Bu/ phosphorus 11,498 -0.27 -2.37 -0.08
Buy potash 19,060 -0.12 -0.37 -0.09
Sell com grain 13,354 2.56 2.47 2.86
Sell soybeans 4,386 7.30 7.04 13.18
Sell alfalfa hay 213 57,73 47.26 58.82
Sell oats 0 1.56 3.92
Sell pasture 0 8.00 0 24.24
Table D.ll. Range analysis for
landlord, scenario
Selected Activities
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selected activities on the JsBper County fara for 50-50
t«o
Activity lavel Input Cost
Range of costs where activity
level remains unchanged
Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, till~plant, contour, 120C2 204 -32.13 32.13 w
CB, 8lot-plant» contour, 120C2 0 -32.13 • «S -29.17
CB, till-plant, contour, 162D2 66 -31.00 31.00 «a
CB, slot-plant, contour, 162D2 0 -31.00 — m -28.04
CB, till-plant. terrace, 162D2 0 -31.00 * m 61.01
CB, till-plant, none, 119A1 34 -33.26 -33.26 flp
CB, till-plant. terrace, 24E2 0 -28.28 — m 75.24
CB, till-plant. contour, 24E2 34 -28.28 -28.28 CP
Bu)r herbicides 6,273 -1.00 -1.59 -0.40
LP gas 4.149 •^.686 -2.68 0.05
Bvy nitrogen 24,888 -0.14 -0.35 0.01
Bi;^ phosphorus 15,830 -0.27 -1.71 0.02
Biqt potash
, 17,592 -0.12 -1.57 -0.01
Sell corn grain 24,888 2.56 2.23 3,06
Sell soybeans 8,122 7.30 6.70 17.71
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 0» 61.96
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 2.32
Sell pasture 0 8.00 ^ 00 34.82
Borrow short-term capital 14,871 -0.075 -0.58 m
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Table B.I2. Range analysis for selected activities on the Ida County farm for 50-50
landlord, scenario two
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity Level Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, tlll-plant, contour, iD3 47 -27.60 -27.60 »
COMHM, conventional, none, 1D3 0 -21.66 • a> -18.94
CBC(M^, conventional, none, 1D3 0 -25.31 «o -23.93
CB, till-plant, terrace, 1D3 0 -27.60 ^ m 52.92
CB, tlll-plant, contour, 1E3 93 -26.54 -26.54 s>
CB, till-plant, terrace, 1E3 0 -26.54 — « 76,98
CB, spring-disk, none, 10C2 56 -29.26 -29.26 CP
CBCOMM, conventional, none, 10C2 0 -26.41 -22.48
CB, spring-disk, none, 10D2 52 -28.13 -28.13 S
COHMM, conventional, none, 10D2 0 -21.87 ^ Oft. -17.43
CB, till-planc, contour, 12C1 62 -29.99 -29.99 m
CBCOMH, conventional, none, 12C1 0 -26.90 -21.99
Bt^r herbicides 5,719 -1.00 -1.06 0.08
Bu/ LP gas 2,600 -0.686 -0.88 0.05
Bi^ short-term capital 11,214 -0.075 -0.12 1.0
nitrogen 15,596 -0.14 -0.21 -0.02
Bt9 phosphorus 9,948 -0.27 -2.44 -0.18
Biy potash 11,072 -0.12 -1.01 -0.11
Sell com grain 15,596 2.56 2.53 2.91
Sell soybeans 5,124 7.30 7.20 eo
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 OS 58.2
Sell oats 0 1.56 — m 2.91
Sell pasture 0 8.00 — m 36.92
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Table ».13. Etange analysis for selected activities on the Boone County farm for 100-65
tenant, scenario two
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity Level Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, till-plant, none, 107A1 144 -65.51 -68.50
CB, slot-plant, none, 107A1 0 -64.16 — g» -61.17
COMMH, 8lot*-plent, none, 107A1 0 -45.29 — c» -40.13
CB, till-plant, none, 53A1 80 -66.33 -67.63
COMMM, slot-plant, none, 55A1 0 -45.80 — 40 -44.50
CB, till-plant, none, 138B1 74 -65.51 -65.93 m
CB, till-plant, contour, 138B1 0 -65.51 — QD -65.08
COMMM, slot-plant, none, 138B1 0 -45.36 • m -44.89
C8, till-plant, contour, 138C2 22 -64,76 -67.71 (0
P, conventional, none, 138C2 0 -8.95 — «B 47.88
COMMM, slot-plant, contour, 136C2 0 -44.96 — 0 -35.34
Biy herbicides 5,904 -1.00 -1.38 -0.53
B19 dlesel 2,025 -1.30 -3.24 0.10
Biy LP gas 3,948 -0.686 -2.11 0,05
Biy short-term capital 38,330 -0.075 -0.44 0.12
B\9 medium-term capital 26,894 -0.15 -0.34 -0.05
B19 nitrogen 24.731 -0.14 -0.30 0.01
Buy phosphorus 15,111 -0.27 -1.69 0.02
Biy potash 16,824 -0.12 -1.38 -0.04
Sell corn grain 23,681 2.56 2.20 3.67
Sell soybeans 7,788 7.30 6.64 10.43
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 m 62.42
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 2.40
Sel pasture 0 8.00 0 19.90
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Table B.14. Range aaalysls for selected actlvlCiea on the Van
tenant^ scenario Cvo
Buren County farm Cor 100-65
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity Level Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
P, conventional, none, 65E2 0 -7.76 -0.82
CB, clll-plant, none, 131B1 108 -64.23 -64.64
COMMM, slot-^lant, contour, 131B1 0 -44.62 «o -40.65
CB, till-plant, contour, 13181 0 -64,23 •- OB -63.83
CB, tlll-plant, contour, 132C2 108 -62,74 -65.71 m
CB, slot-plant, contour, 132C2 0 -61.39 — 00 -58.42
B19 herbicides 3,985 -1.00 -1.32 -^1.46
Buy dlesel 1,306 -1.30 -7.09 0.10
Buy LP gas 2,226 -0.686 -2.60 0.05
Buy short-tern capital 23,938 -0.075 -0.46 0.36
Buy medlua-term capital 17,602 -0.15 -0,58 -0.065
Buy nitrogen 13,354 -0.14 -0,34 0,01
Biqt phosphorus 8,517 -0.27 -1.41 0.02
Buy potash 9,479 -0.12 -1.13 -0.01
Sell com grain 13,354 2.56 2.06 3,71
Sell soybeans 4,386 7.30 6.41 12.00
Sell alfalfa hqr 0 57.73 — CO 64.05
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 3.02
Sell pasture 0 8.00 0 12.12
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Table B.15. (Unge analysis for selected activities on the Jasper County farm for 100-65
tenant, scenario two
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity level Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, till-plant, contour, 120C2 204 -66.61 -69.57 ao
CB, slot-plant, contour, 120C2 0 -65.26 — m -62.30
CH, till-plant, contour, 16202 6S -65.21 -68.18 dp
CB, till-plant, none, 119A1 34 -68.05 -71.09 09
COMMM, slot-plant, contour, 24E2 34 -43.34 -43,34 9
COMMM, chisel, none, 24E2 0 -44.90 «e -44.05
CB, till-plant, contour, 24E2 0 -61.76 ^ OP -61.43
Pasture, conventional, none, 24E2 0 -8.49 — 4) 1.22
Biy herbicides 5.856 -1.00 -1.38 -0.97
Buy insecticide 69 -1.00 -1.17 0.08
Buy diesel 2,323 -1.30 -1.42 0.10
Biq' LP gas 4,000 0.686 -2.42 -0.61
Biy short-tern capital 39,782 -0.075 -0.22 -0.06
Bi^ medium-term capital 29,573 -0.15 -0.16 -0.05
Biy nitrogen 23,478 -0.14 -0.32 -0.13
Bt^ phosphorus 16,239 -0.27 -0.29 0.02
B19 potash 20,280 -0.12 -0.124 -0.02
Sell corn grain 23,995 2.56 2.12 2.58
Sell soybeans 7,631 7.30 6.50 7.34
Sell alfalfa hay 70 57.73 57.47 63.43
Sell oats 391 1.56 1.51 2.58
Sell straw 6 50.00 46.98 118.20
Sell pasture 0 8.00 0 11.21
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Table B.16. Range analysis for selected activities on the Ida County faro for 100-65
tenant, scenario tvo
Range of costs where activity
Selected Activities Activity Level Input Cost Upper Cost Lower Cost
CB, till-plant, contour, 1D3 47 -61.14 -64.06 <D
CD, slot-plane, contour, 1D3 0 -59.80 — to -56.79
slot-plant, contour, 103 0 -43.05 • m -42.13
P, conventional, none, 1D3 0 -3.95 19.40
CB, till-plant, contour, 1E3 0 -59.79 " «0 -53.10
P, conventional, none, 1E3 0 -1.94 -19.61 1.48
CB, spring-disk, none, 1QC2 56 -64.58 -64.59 CP
COMMM, slot-plant, contour, 10C2 0 -44.11 -- -38.79
CB, tlll-^lant, contour, 10C2 0 -63.24 — B -63.23
CB, spring-disk, none, 10D2 52 -63.15 -63.16 OD
CB, till-plant, contour, 10D2 0 -61.81 — flO -61.80
CB, till-plant, contour, 12C1 62 -64.15 -67.10
CB, spring-disk, none, 12C1 0 -65.50 — «» -62.59
B19 herbicides 4.004 -1.00 -1.46 -0.998
Biy diesel 1,357 -1.30 -1.32 -1.02
Buy LP gas 2,039 -0.686 -1.97 -0.37
Bvy short-tero capital 23,420 -0.075 -0.244 -0.072
Buy nediuffl-teriB cpaital 18,221 -0.15 -0.151 -0.129
Biy nitrogen 12,233 -0.14 -0.28 -0.09
Buy phosphorus 7.812 -0.27 -0.85 -0.18
Buy potash 8,701 -0.12 -0.38 -0.04
Sell corn grain 12,233 2,56 2.23 2.65
Sell soybeans 4,030 7.30 6.68 7.55
Sell alfalfa hay 0 57.73 — ee 62.55
Sell oats 0 1.56 -0.75 2.35
Sell pasture 0 6.0 CO 9.45
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APPENDIX C: INCOME AND SOIL EROSION LEVELS BY TENURE FOR
ALTERNATIVE SOIL EROSION RESTRICTION POLICIES
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Table C.l. Boone County Farm: Income and soil erosion levels bf tenure for alternative
soil erosion restriction policies
Percent Counter- Percent Whole Percent Total Percent
Net Change Part Net Change Farm Net Change Soil Change
Scenario Returns From BASE® Returns'* From BASE* Returns^ Froa BASE® Loss From BASE®
lA 64,382 -6.36 1,082 +117.71
2A 68,754 0 497 0
3A 68,657 -0.14 225 -54.73
4A 68,657 -0.14 225 -54.73
5A 68,547 -0.30 350 -29.58
6A 68.432 -0.47 225 -54.73
7A 68,123 -0.92 105 -78.87
IB 20,789 -17.38 43,593 40.15 64,382 -6.27 1,082 -(-190.86
2B 25,161 0 43,529 0 68.690 0 372 0
4B 25,158 -0.01 43,310 -0.50 68,468 -0.32 149 -59.95
IC 43,593 0 20.789 -17.38 64,382 -6.36 1,082 +117.71
2C 43,593 0 25,161 0 68,754 0 497 0
4C 43,528 -0.15 25,130 -0.12 68,658 -0.14 225 -54.73
ID 23,269 -15.80 40,770 -0.84 64,039 -6.86 595 +19.72
2D 27,637 0 41,117 0 68,754 0 497 0
4D 27,540 -0.35 41,117 0 68,657 -0.14 225 -54.73
IE 41,118 0 23,264 -15.82 64,382 -6.36 1,082 +117.71
2E 41,118 0 27,636 0 68,754 0 497 0
4E 41,118 0 27,540 -0.35 68,657 -0.14 225 -54.73
®BASE represents scenario 2.
^Net returns that the other lease party would
^Whole farm net returns for sane solution.
receive for sane solution.
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Table C.2> Van Buren County Farn: Incooe and Boll erosion levels by tenure for
alternative soil erosion restriction policies
Percent Counter- Percent Whole Percent Total Percent
Net Change Part Net Change Faro Net Change Soil Change
Scenario Returns From BASE« Returns^ From BASE® Returns*^ Fron BASE® Loss From BASE*
lA
2A
3A
4A
5A
6A
7A
32,756
35.587
32,356
32,356
3^.467
33,756
31,831
-7.96
0
-9.08
-9.08
-3.15
-5.15
-10.55
7,978
5,084
419
419
1,423
1,423
161
+56.92
-91.76
-91.76
-72.01
-72.01
-96.83
IB 8,845 -24.24 23,867 0 32,712 -7.97 7,028 +70.00
2B 11,675 0 23,868 0 35,543 0 4,134 0
4B 10,474 -10.29 21,882 -8.32 32,356 -8.97 419 -89.86
5B 11,056 -5.30 23,228 -2.68 34,284 -3.54 1,136 -72.52
6B 10,488 -10.17 23,228 -2.68 33,716 -5.14 1,136 -72.52
7B 9,948 -14.79 21,883 -8.32 31,831 -10.44 161 -96.11
IC 27,003 0 4.314 -39.62 31,317 -8.29 9,403 +44.46
2C 27,003 0 7,145 0 34,148 0 6,509 0
4C 22,030 -18.42 10,123 +41.68 32,153 -5.84 340 -94.78
5C 25,372 -6.04 7,497 +4.93 32,869 -3.75 2,230 -65.74
60 24,257 -10.17 7,497 +4.93 31,754 -7.01 2,230 -65.74
7C 21,955 -18.69 6.023 -15.70 27,978 -18.07 998 -84.67
ID 9,645 -22.03 21,484 -7.29 31,129 -12.42 1,853 -55.18
2D 12,370 0 23,173 0 35,543 0 4.134 0
4D 10,870 -12.13 21,485 -7.29 32,355 -8.97 419 -89.86
5D 11,295 -8.69 23,172 0 34,467 -3.03 1,423 -65.58
6D 10,708 -13.44 21,484 -7.29 32,192 -9.43 448 -89.16
7D 10,347 -16.35 21,484 -7.29 31,831 -10.44 161 -96.11
IE 27,476 0 3,841 -37.87 31,317 -6.96 10,827 +135.78
2E 27.476 0 6.182 0 33,658 0 4,592 0
4E 21,614 -21.33 9,810 +58.69 31,424 -6.64 397 -91.35
SE 26,504 -3.54 6,182 0 32,686 -2.89 1,944 -57.67
6E 25,804 -6.09 1,042 -83.14 26,846 -20.24 1,269 -72.36
7E 23,270 -15.31 1,038 -83.21 24,308 -27.78 1,269 -72.36
^BASE represents scenario 2.
''Net returns that the other lease party would receive for sane solution,
^Whole farn net returns for saae solution.
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Table C.3i Jasper County Farm: loconte and soil erosion levels h/ tenure for
alternative soli erosion restriction policies
Scenario
lA
2A
3A
4A
5A
6A
7A
Percent Counter-
Net Change Part Net
Returns Fron BASB^ Returns^
66,954
71,366
61,448
62,167
66.832
67.418
62,873
-6.18
0
-13.90
-12.89
-3.55
-5.53
-11.90
Percent Whole
Change Farm Net
Froo BASE® Returns^
Percent Total
Change Soil
From BASE^ Loss
15,607
11,658
1,125
1,077
2.830
2.830
1,902
Percent
Change
From BASE®
+33.87
0
-90.35
-90.76
-75.72
-75.72
-83.69
IB 21,625 -16.35 45,329 -0.19 66,954 -6.05 15,607 +60.32
2B 25,852 0 45,414 0 71,266 0 9,735 0
3B 24,281 -6.08 23,652 -47.92 47,933 -32.74 1,231 -87.35
4B 22,367 -13.48 39,082 -13.94 61,449 -13.78 1,125 -88.44
5B 24.355 -5.79 44,476 -2.07 68,831 -1.43 2,830 -70.93
6B 23,080 -10.72 43,593 -4.01 66,673 -3.78 1,902 -80.46
7B 21.478 -16.92 38,436 -15.37 59,914 -15.42 120 -98.77
IC 45.514 0 21,341 -17.45 66,855 -6.32 19.820 +70.01
2C 45,514 0 25,852 0 71.366 0 11,658 0
3C 39,174 -13.93 22,139 -14.36 61,313 -14.09 1,103 -90.54
4C 39,781 -12.60 22,251 -13.93 62,032 -13.08 1,185 -89.84
5C 43,063 -5.39 25,768 -0.32 68,831 -3.55 2,830 -75.72
6C 41,731 -8.31 24,802 -4.06 66,533 -6.77 1,944 -83.32
7C 39,906 -12.32 21,754 -15,85 61,660 -13.60 325 -97.21
10 24.243 -14.42 41,651 -2.52 65,894 -7.26 10,579 +16.68
20 28,327 0 42,727 0 71,054 0 9.067 0
40 24,493 -13.53 36,955 -13.51 61,448 -13.52 995 -89.03
50 26,105 -7.84 42,726 0 68,831 -3,13 2.830 -68.79
6D 25,025 -11.66 41,648 -2.53 66,673 -6.17 1,902 -79.02
7D 23,954 -15.44 35,960 -15.84 59,914 -15.68 120 -98.68
IE 43,051 0 23,804 -13.15 66,855 -5.11 19,818 +69.99
2E 43,051 U 27,407 0 70,458 0 11,658 0
3E 38,718 -10.06 14,064 -48.68 52.782 -25.09 694 -94.05
4E 39,099 -9.18 14,429 -47.35 53,528 -24.03 864 -92.59
5E 41.492 -3.62 22,275 -18.73 63,767 -9.50 2,293 -80.33
6E 40,706 -5.45 10,689 -61.00 51,229 -27.29 1,166 -90.00
7E 38,559 -10.43 15,172 -44.64 53,731 -23.74 775 -93.35
®BASE represents scenario 2.
'^ Net returns Chat the other lease party would receive for saoe solution.
^Whole farm net returns for saae solution.
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Table C.4. Ida County Farm: Income and soil erosion levels hy tenure for
alternative soil erosion restriction policies
Percent
BASE®
Percent Counter- Percent Whole Percent Total Percent
Net Change Part Net Change Farm Net Change Soil Change
Scenario Returns From BASE® Returns'* From BASE® Returns^ From BASE® Loss From B
lA
2A
3A
4A
5A
6A
7A
31,989
35,650
25,053
25,053
32,760
31,313
27,633
-10.27
0
-29.73
-29.73
-8.11
-12.17
-22.49
30,341
18,456
752
752
2,891
2,891
1,511
-•-64.40
0
-95.93
-95.93
-84.34
-84.34
-91.81
IB 7,048 -27.69 21,133 -0.97 28,181 -9.35 9,974 +70.47
2B 9,747 0 21,340 0 31,087 0 5,851 0
4B 6,861 -29.61 18,192 -14.75 25,053 -19.41 752 -87.15
IC 26,611 0 5,378 -40.50 31,989 -10.27 30,341 +57.13
2C 26,611 0 9,039 0 35,650 0 19,309 0
4C 18,328 -31.13 6,547 -27.57 24,875 -30.22 719 -96.28
ID 7,046 -23.46 19,773 -6.99 26,819 -11.97 5,656 -32.16
20 9,206 0 21,259 0 30,465 0 8,337 0
4D 6,901 -25.04 18,152 -14.61 25,053 -17.76 752 -90.98
IE 27,067 0 4,922 -42.65 31,989 -10.27 30,341 +64.40
2E 27,067 0 8,583 0 35,650 0 18,456 0
4E 20,065 -25.87 -56 -100.65 20,009 -43.87 690 -96.26
®BASE represents scenario 2.
^et returns that the other lease party would receive for same solution.
^Whole farm net returns for same solution.
